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Labor Law
LABOR LAW

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT THE
SECRETARY OF LABOR Is EMPOWERED TO COMPEL AN EMPLOYItR TO
BARGAIN TO RETAIN THE RIGHT TO DISCHARGE EMPLOYEES FOR THE
WILFUL VIOLATION OF REASONABLE SAFETY STANDARDS WHICH ARE
FEASIBLE EXCEPT FOR PREDICTABLE EMPLOYEE NONCOMPLIANCE

Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Commission (1976)
Petitioners were stevedoring concerns which employed longshoremen
and operated in the Port of Philadelphia.' In April 1973, after inspecting
petitioners' docks in Camden, New Jersey, 2 an Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSHA) 3 compliance officer 4 charged petitioners with violating a
"longshoring hardhat" standard,' which requires employees to wear
protective hats.6 The United States Secretary of Labor, who promulgated the
standard, 7 proposed an assessment of civil penalties8 against petitioners
1. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 534 F.2d 541, 544 (3d Cir. 1976).
2. Id.
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1970). For a discussion of the relevant provisions of
OSHA, see notes 20-23 and accompanying text infra.
4. Section 8(a) of OSHA authorizes the Secretary to enter any workplace at
reasonable times "to inspect and investigate ... within reasonable limits and in a
reasonable manner .... 29 U.S.C. §657(a) (1970).
5. 534 F.2d at 544. 29 C.F.R. § 1918.105(a) (1975) provides: "Employees shall be
protected by protective hats meeting the specifications contained in the American
National Standard Safety Requirements for Industrial Head Protection .

. . ."

Id..

6. The standard at issue, which was adopted pursuant to section 941 of the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970),
and the regulations promulgated thereunder, 29 C.F.R. § 1918.6(b)(1), (2) (1976), is
enforceable under section 4(b)(2) of OSHA, which provides that the aforementioned
longshoring hardhat standard and similar standards "shall be deemed to be
occupational safety and health standards issued under this Chapter." 29 U.S.C.
§ 653(b)(2) (1970)..
The evidence presented at trial established that, out of 225 longshoremen
employed by the petitioners who were observed by the compliance officer, approximately 50 wore the required hardhats. 534 F.2d at 544 n.2.
7. Section 6(a) of OSHA empowers the Secretary of Labor to promulgate specific
safety standards under the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1970).
8. 534 F.2d at 544. The Secretary cited petitioners for violation of section 5(a)(2)
of OSHA, which provides that "each employer ... shall comply with occupational
safety and health standards promulgated under this Chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2)
(1970). The monetary penalties assessed aggregated $455. 534 F.2d at 544 & n.3.
Although the Secretary of Labor is empowered to propose penalties in
connection with violations of the provisions of OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 659(a) (1970),
section 17(i) provides that "the [Occupational Safety and Health Review] Commission
shall have authority to assess all civil penalties provided in this section ....

."

Id.

§ 666(i).
Section 12(a) provides for the establishment of the Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission (Commission), a three-member tribunal appointed by the
President to conduct hearings, via hearing examiners under its command pursuant to
section 12(i) in the event that employers contest the charges of violation of OSHA
proposed by the Secretary. Id. § 661(a), (i).
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and ordered immediate abatement of the violations. 9 Claiming that
opposition to the hard hat standard by the longshoremen and their union
rendered its enforcement impossible, petitioners filed notices of contest,10
which culminated in a hearing before an administrative law judge of the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (Commission)." The
judge held petitioners in violation of the longshoring hardhat standard i but
vacated ihe Secretary's proposed penalties.' 3 Petitioners subsequently
15
14
sought review by the Commission, which affirmed the judge's decision.

9. 534 F.2d at 544.
10. Id. Section 10(a) provides that the employer has "fifteen working days within
" 29 U.S.C.
which to notify the Secretary that he wishes to contest the citation ..
§659(a) (1970).
11. 534 F.2d at 544. Section 10(c) provides that "the Commission shall thereafter
issue an order, based on findings of fact, affirming, modifying, or vacating the
Secretary's citation or proposed penalty .

. . ."

29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1970).

12. 534 F.2d at 545; see note 5 and accompanying text supra. Petitioners testified
that, beginning in 1971, they had undertaken exhaustive but unsuccessful measures
to obtain compliance with the standard by their employees. 534 F.2d at 545. Their
efforts entailed furnishing the required headgear, encouraging their use at safety
meetings, posting hardhat signs on the working premises, using payroll envelope
stuffers advocating use of hardhats, and placing hardhat safety messages on the
hiring tapes. Id. However, all attempts met with failure, and each employer witness
testified that wildcat strikes would result from more strenuous efforts to enforce
compliance, e.g., firing employees who refused to wear a hardhat. Id. The evidence
showed that in 1970 a wildcat strike resulted in the Port of New York over that very
issue, and that in 1971 petitioners themselves had weathered an angry demonstration
by longshoring foremen who objected violently to threats of dismissal for failure to
comply. Id. at 545 n.4, 546 n.7. However, the petitioners presented no testimony to
indicate that they had ever dismissed a longshoremen employee for failure to comply
with the hardhat standard. Id. at 545. Petitioners therefore contended that, since their
compliance was unattainable due to the unwavering opposition to the standard by the
longshoremen employees, the Secretary's citations and proposed penalties should be
abandoned and the standard declared infeasible. Id.
13. 534 F.2d at 545.
14. Id. Section 12(i) provides that "[tihe report of the hearing examiner shall
become the final order of the Commission within thirty days ...unless within such
period any Commission member has directed that such report shall be reviewed by the
Commission." 29 U.S.C. § 661(i) (1970).

15. 534 F.2d at 545. Of the three Commissioners who heard the appeal,
Commissioners Cleary and Van Names voted to affirm the decision by the
administrative law judge, and Commissioner Moran dissented. Id. Each filed a
separate opinion. Commissioners Moran and Van Namee agreed that the evidence
tended to show that a work stoppage would occur if petitioners attempted to enforce
the standard by dismissing recalcitrant employees. Id. at 546. However, while
Commissioner Van Namee expressed his belief that the Commission itself was
empowered under OSHA to issue cease and desist orders against employees,
Chairman Moran disagreed as to the validity of these orders, concluding that the
employers had fulfilled all requirements under OSHA. Id. On the other hand,
Commissioner Cleary believed that the threat of wildcat strikes was "largely
speculative," and that where, as in the instant case, employee noncompliance was
neither unpredictable or sporadic, the employer had an absolute statutory obligation
to enforce the applicable standard. Id.
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On petition for review, 16 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit 17 affirmed the Commission's order, 18 holding, inter alia,19 that
the Secretary of Labor is empowered to command that an employer in the
collective bargaining process bargain to retain the right to discipline
employees for the wilful violation of reasonable safety standards which are
feasible except for foreseeable employee resistance. Atlantic & Gulf
Stevedores, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 534
F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1976).
Enacted in 1970, OSHA was designed to effectuate the express
congressional intent "to assure so far as possible every working man and
woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions." 20 To promote
its primary objectives, the statute commands each employer to provide his
employees with a workplace "free from recognized hazards that are causing
or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm."'" In addition to this
general duty clause, OSHA requires that employers and employees adhere to
specific safety standards promulgated by the Secretary of Labor 22 by
16. Judicial review of an order of the Commission is provided for under section
11(a) of the Act. See 29 U.S.C. §660(a) (1970).
17. The case was heard by Judges Forman, Gibbons, and Rosenn. Judge Gibbons
wrote the opinion.
18. Specifically, the Third Circuit concluded that petitioners had failed to
introduce evidence indicating that they had bargained in good faith for the requisite
disciplinary privilege, actually discharged or disciplined employees or threatened to
do so, petitioned the Secretary for a variance of the standard (see 29 U.S.C. § 655(d)
(1970)), or requested an extension of the time within which compliance was to be
attained (see id. § 659(c) (1970)). 534 F.2d at 555-56. Consequently, the court held that
petitioners failed to establish the infeasibility of the challenged standard. Id. at 556.
19. In addition, the Third Circuit ruled that employers were not held to a higher
standard of care under specific OSHA standards than under OSHA's general duty
clause; that the validity of a specific safety standard may be determined by the
Commission in an enforcement proceeding under section 11(a); that the Court of
Appeals may also entertain challenges to the validity of a specific safety standard in
an enforcement proceeding, as well as in a direct petition for review under section 6(f);
that OSHA does not confer upon the Secretary of Labor or the Commission the power
to sanction employees who. fail to adhere to the terms of the Act; and that the
reviewing court may, under certain circumstances, consider the fact of employee
recalcitrance to determine if enforcement of the safety standard would prove
inequitable, in which case enforcement could be denied or limited. 534 F.2d at 544-56.
20. 29 U.S.C. §651 (1970). In this section Congress enunciated its determination
that "personal injuries and illnesses arising out of work situations impose a
substantive burden upon, and are a hindrance to, interstate commerce in terms of lost
production, wage loss, medical expenses, and disability compensation payments." Id.
For discussions of OSHA, see Cohen, OSHA and the Workplace Environment: An
Unfulfilled Promise, 27 N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. 213 (1974); Greenberg, OSHA: More
Headaches for the Building Industry, 7 PUB. CONT. L.J. 106 (1975); Marinelli, OSHA:
The Right of a Worker to a Safe Work PlaceEnvironment, 78 W. VA. L. REV. 57 (1975);
Mullins, OSHA - The Federal Government and Job Safety, 11 RocKy MTN. MiN. L.
INST. 155 (1974); Comment, The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: An
Overview, 4 CUM.-SAM. L. REV. 525 (1974); Comment, The Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970: Its Role in Civil Litigation, 28 Sw. L.J. 999 (1970).
21. 29 U.S.C. §654(a)(1) (1970).
22. Sections 5(a)(2) and 5(b) impose upon an employer a duty to comply with all
safety and health standards promulgated under OSHA and with all rules, regulations,
and orders issued pursuant to OSHA which apply to his own actions and conduct. Id.
§ 654(a)(2), (b). Section 2(b)(3) authorizes the Secretary to set mandatory occupational

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977

3

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1977], Art. 11

852

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

providing that "employers and employees have separate but dependent
responsibilities and rights with respect to achieving healthful working
23
conditions."
One issue which arose under these statutory provisions was the extent
to which, and under what circumstances, an employer incurred liability for a
violation of either the general duty clause of OSHA or a specific safety
standard promulgated by the Secretary when such violation was a direct
result of wilful employee noncompliance. In National Realty Construction
Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission,24 in which an
5
employer was charged with a violation of the general duty clause of OSHA1
stemming from a reckless and fatal act by a company employee, 26 the
District of Columbia Circuit held that the general duty clause of OSHA did
not impose strict liability on employers but merely required the elimination
of preventable hazards. 27 Consequently, the court reasoned, an employer
could not be held liable for grave hazards arising as a result of "demented,
suicidal, or wilfully reckless" 28 employee misconduct for which no "demonstrably feasible measures" 29 existed to materially reduce its likelihood. Such
acts would be held to constitute "unpreventable" 30 hazardous conduct. 31 In
safety and health standards applicable to businesses affecting interstate commerce.
Id. § 651(b)(3). Procedures for the promulgation of these standards are established in
section 6. See id. § 655.
23. Id. §651(b)(2).
24. 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
25. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
26. The employee, a foreman with the company, clung to the exterior of a frontend loader driven by a subordinate employee, contrary to a company policy
prohibiting employees from riding on heavy equipment. The loader's engine stalled,
the employee leaped off and was killed when the vehicle toppled over on him. 489 F.2d
at 1262. The employee's supervisor testified at a hearing that loader riding was an
extremely rare occurrence at National Realty, and that he had personally witnessed
only four or five employees in the past two years riding on heavy equipment. Id.
27. The court maintained:
Hazardous conduct is not preventable if it is so idiosyncratic and implausible in
motive or means that conscientious experts, familiar with the industry, would not
take it into account in prescribing a safety program . . .[or] if its elimination
would require methods of hiring, training, monitoring or sanctioning workers
which are either so untested or so expensive that safety experts would
substantially concur in thinking the methods infeasible.
Id. at 1266.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1267.
30. Id. It is interesting to note that the court was not totally convinced that the
employee misconduct at issue constituted "unpreventable" conduct, since an incident
involving a foreman's wilful noncompliance with a stringent company policy was
indicative of a general laxity of enforcement. Id. at 1267 n.3. However, since the
Secretary failed to introduce evidence concerning measures which National Realty
could have taken to improve its safety policy, the court held that the Secretary failed
to carry the burden of proof on this issue. Id. at 1267.
31. Id. at 1266-67. Other decisions support the conclusion espoused in National
Realty that the general duty clause requires only the elimination of preventable
hazards and does not impose strict liability on employers for the willful and
unforeseeable conduct of employees. E.g., Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm'n (Hanovia Lamp Div.), 502 F.2d 946 (3d Cir. 1974); see REA Express,
Inc. v. Brennan, 495 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1974). This analysis has also been adopted in
cases concerning violations of specific safety standards promulgated by the Secretary
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Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission (Hanovia
Lamp Division),32 wherein a previously reliable employee apparently
committed suicide,3 3 the Third Circuit followed the reasoning of the District
of Columbia Circuit in National Realty and remanded the case for a
determination of whether the means suggested by the Secretary of Labor to
' ' 34
prevent such occurrences were "demonstrably feasible.
The lack of statutory guidance necessitated judicial disposition of
another aspect of OSHA: whether in determining the validity of a given
safety standard and the employer's duty to comply therewith, the Secretary
has statutory authority to consider the economic impact upon an employer
who was forced to comply with that standard. The Third Circuit, in AFLCIO v. Brennan,35 relying heavily upon the District of Columbia Circuit's
decision in AFL-CIO v. Hodgson,3 6 held that the Secretary could consider
' 37
economic consequences in his "quasi-legislative standard setting.
The principal case was the first decision to consider whether the
Secretary could insist upon employer compliance with an occupational
safety and health standard even though employer enforcement had resulted
in predictable noncompliance and was likely to be resisted by wildcat strikes
and work stoppages. 38 This case was also the first to raise the issue of
whether the validity of a standard being imposed was subject to challenge
and review in an enforcement proceeding, as opposed to the usual preof Labor under 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1970) and included in the ambit of OSHA under 29
U.S.C. § 651(3) (1970). E.g., Home Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 528 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1976); Brennan v. Butler Lime &
Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1975); see Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc, v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 529 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1976); AccuNamics, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 515 F.2d 823 (5th Cir.
1975).
32. 502 F.2d 946 (3d Cir. 1974).
33. In Hanovia Lamp, petitioner's employee, an experienced technician who had
been employed by Hanovia Lamp for 21 years and who had possessed an accident-free
record, apparently committed suicide by manipulating high voltage wires in such a
manner as to constitute "'a classic, fundamental, basic illustration as to what not to
do, and it couldn't have been done better had you tried.'" Id. at 949, quoting Trial
Transcript at 24.
34. 502 F.2d at 951-53. As in National Realty, the court was not convinced that
the Secretary had met his burden of proof in establishing the feasibility of preventive
measures. The case was remanded, however, because testimony of an expert witness
at trial suggested that there was some evidence to support the Secretary's contention.
Id. at 952.
35. 530 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1975).
36. 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Hodgson, the court determined that, although
Congress anticipated substantial increases in production costs for employers who
complied with specific safety standards, Congress did not intend the implementation
of protective measures without regard to their economic impact. Id. at 477.
37. 530 F.2d at 123. The courts in Brennan and Hodgson referred to the
amendment of section 6(b)(5), which authorized the Secretary to set feasible
standards. See 29 U.S.C. §655(b)(5) (1970). According to Senator Javits, the
amendment's author, this was intended to require expressly the Secretary to consider
the feasibility of proposed standards. S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1970),
The Hodgson court interpreted this to mean that "practical [economic] considerations
can temper protective requirements." 499 F.2d at 477. The Brennan court adopted this
construction. See 530 F.2d at 122-23.
38. 534 F.2d at 547; see notes 55-63 and accompanying text infra.
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enforcement hearing.3 9 The Third Circuit began its determination of
whether petitioners were compelled to comply with the safety standard in
question, notwithstanding employee resistance in the form of uniform and
predictable work stoppages. 40 Although distinguishing the present case from
Hanovia Lamp 4' on the ground that the latter case did not involve uniform
and predictable employee conduct, 42 the present court nevertheless employed
the test used in Hanovia Lamp and held that petitioners had available
"demonstrably feasible measures" 43 which would reduce the incidence of
such employee noncompliance - specifically, the decision not to employ
those persons who would not comply. 44 However, the court acknowledged

that economic repercussions should be considered in order to determine
whether the "demonstrably feasible" means were so unreasonable as to
45
render the safety standard invalid and thus unenforceable.
Before examining the merits, the court considered whether it had
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the safety standard. 46 The court
noted that in the typical case, the validity was challenged in a preenforcement proceeding through a petition for review under section 6(f) of

39. 534 F.2d at 548; see notes 45-51 and accompanying text infra.
40. 534 F.2d at 547. The court, pursuant to section 11(a), accepted the findings of
Commissioners Van Namee and Moran that a massive work stoppage would likely
result from attempted enforcement of the hardhat standard, in its belief that such a
finding would be supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Id. at
546, citing 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1970). Section 11(a) provides that the reviewing court is

to accept the "findings of the Commission with respect to questions of fact, if

supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole .... ." 29
U.S.C. § 660(a) (1970).
41. 534 F.2d at 547, citing Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n (Hanovia Lamp Div.), 502 F.2d 946. For a discussion of Hanovia Lamp, see

notes 32-34 and accompanying text supra.

42. 534 F.2d at 547. Furthermore, despite the Secretary's apparent position that a
higher standard of employer care applied where, as here, the violation was of a
specific safety standard rather than the general duty clause, as was the case in
National Realty and Hanovia Lamp, the court declined to make any distinction on

this basis. Thus, the court concluded, "the Hanovia Lamp standard governing

employer responsibility applies, in our view, to [the longshoring hardhat standard] to
the same extent as to the general duty clause." Id.
43. Id., citing Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n
(Hanovia Lamp Div.), 502 F.2d 946, 952 (3d Cir. 1974); see notes 24-34 and
accompanying text supra.

44. 534 F.2d at 547. The court maintained that a discussion of strict employer

liability such as was present in Hanovia Lamp was inapplicable to the Atlantic &
Gulf facts, since in the latter instance, demonstrably feasible measures were
available. Id. However, the court declared that the proposition enunciated in Hanovia
Lamp, that OSHA shall not be construed to impose unreasonable burdens on
employers, applied with equal force to an Atlantic & Gulf situation. Id. at 547-48.

45. Id. at 548; see notes 35-37 and accompanying text supra. The court, in its
discussion of the economic feasibility factor, relied upon its decision in AFL-CIO v.
Brennan, 530 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1975). In Brennan, the court declared that economic
feasibility of a specific safety standard was relevant in determining its validity. The
court had reasoned that since an economically infeasible standard would likely be
uniformly ignored, the burden of policing such a regulation would prove overwhelm-

ing. Id. at 122-23.
46. See 534 F.2d at 548-51.
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OSHA, 47 whereas the present appeal was from a ruling by the Secretary of
Labor in an enforcement proceeding under section 11(a). 48 Notwithstanding
the differences between the two' proceedings, the court considered the
legislative history 9 and policy considerations 50 surrounding OSHA and
held that the validity of a safety standard was determinable in the
enforcement proceeding." It thus followed that a court had similar power to
determine the validity through a petition for review from an enforcement
proceeding as well as from a pre-enforcement proceeding.5 2 The court held,
however, that the burden of proof as to validity differed in the two
proceedings: whereas in a section 6(f) pre-enforcement proceeding the
Secretary bore an affirmative burden to demonstrate the reasonableness of
47. Id. at 548. Section 6(f) of the Act provides in pertinent part:
Any person who may be adversely affected by a standard issued under this
section may at any time prior to the sixtieth day after such standard is
promulgated file a petition challenging the validity of such standard with the
United States Court of Appeals for the circuit wherein such person resides or has
his principal place of business, for a judicial review of such standard ....
29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1970).
48. 534 F.2d at 548, citing 29 U.S.C. §660(a) (1970); see note 16 supra.
49. 534 F.2d at 548-50; see H.R. REP. No. 1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 47-52 (1970);
S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 54-57 (1970). The Commission was created,
according to the court, only to enhance the fairness of enforcement proceedings by
segmenting executive and adjudicatory functions. 534 F.2d at 549; LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970, at 982, 991, 999,
1014-15, 1050, 1058, 1070-71, 1074, 1090-91 (1971). Stating that there was no evidence
in the legislative history "suggesting that the amendment curtailed in any way the
nature and scope of inquiry at the administrative adjudicatory stage," the court
concluded that section 11(a) allows the determination of validity at the enforcement
proceeding. 534 F.2d at 549. Furthermore, the court recognized that Congress could
"restrict review of administrative rule making to a particular forum and withhold
from a sanctioning court the power to review the validity of the underlying rule when
the specified forum had not been availed of." Id. at 550-51, citing Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), and Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943). Since
Congress had not done so with regard to OSHA, the court argued, reviewability at the
enforcement stage would be presumed allowed. 534 F.2d at 551.
50. 534 F.2d at 549-50. In support of its assertion that Congress did not intend to
eliminate all challenges to a standard's validity that are not asserted within 60 days
of the standard's effective date, the court relied upon two modes of analysis. Id.
Although section 6(f) of the Act provides for pre-enforcement review of a challenged
standard, the filing of a 6(f) petition for review will not operate to stay enforcement
proceedings stemming from a violation of the standard prior to a judicial ruling on its
validity. Therefore, the court reasoned, the Commission must be authorized to
consider defenses of invalidity, lest it be reduced to "rubber-stamping" potentially
invalid citations. Id. at 550.
In addition, the court asserted that a standard may prove economically or
technologically infeasible only after the 60-day period for pre-enforcement review has
elapsed, in which case the Commission would be the only forum available in which to
plead the defense of invalidity. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 551. The court further noted that "judicial review of the Commission's
adjudicatory [decisions] is plenary....." Id. at 550, citing Brennan v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n (Hanovia Lamp Div.), 502 F.2d 946 (3d Cir. 1974),
and Budd Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 513 F.2d 201 (3d Cir.
1975); see 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1970), which provides in pertinent part: "Upon such
filing [of a petition for review], the court shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and
of the question determined therein, and shall have power to [enter a] decree affirming,
modifying, or setting aside in whole or in part, the order of the Commission ...... Id.
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the promulgated standard,5 3 the petitioning employer had the burden in an
enforcement proceeding to prove as an affirmative defense that the standard
as applied was "arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or contrary to law." 5 4
Turning to the merits of the principal case, the court concluded that
petitioners had met their burden of proof.55 The court then considered the
legal sufficiency of petitioners' defense.56 Although acknowledging that
neither the Secretary nor the Commission could issue cease and desist orders
to the petitioners' employees,5 7 the court concluded that the standard was
nevertheless economically feasible, since the policy of OSHA was to place
primary responsibility on the employer.58 Furthermore, the court listed
several alternatives open to the employer to enforce compliance: 1) to
Further support for this conclusion, although apparently not relied on by the court,

can be found in the Senate Report on OSHA which stated in pertinent part:
Section 6(f) provides that any person who may be adversely affected by a
standard may, within 60 days of its issuance, seek judicial review in an

appropriate United States Court of Appeals. While this would be the exclusive
method for obtaining pre-enforcement judicial review of a standard, the provision
does not foreclose an employer from challenging the validity of a standard during
an enforcement proceeding.
S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1970), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970, at 148 (1971). For an analysis

of OSHA's legislative history concerning the issue of review of standards within an
enforcement proceeding, see Morey, Mandatory Occupational Safety and Health
Standards - Some Legal Problems, 38 LAw & CONTEMP. PROS. 584, 596-99 (1974).

53. 534 F.2d at 551; see note 47 supra.To support this conclusion, the court looked

to its prior holding in Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfr's Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155
(3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975), which mandated that the section 11(e)
requirement that the Secretary explain his actions, and the section 11(f) requirement
that he proffer substantial evidence to support the validity of a challenged standard,
be read together. Id.
54. 534 F.2d at 551-52. The court's conclusion was based in part on the fact that
Congress intended to limit a validity challenge to some extent by providing for a 60day limitation for which to bring such a challenge under section 6(f). Id., citing 29
U.S.C. § 655(f); see note 47 supra.
55. 534 F.2d at 552.
56. Id.
57. 534 F.2d at 555. Despite the Secretary's express opinion that Commissioner
Van Namee was incorrect and that the issue was not relevant to the appellate
proceeding, id. at 552-53 & nn.14 & 15, the court believed it necessary to refute
specifically the Commissioner's view that OSHA mandated the issuance of cease and
desist orders directly to employees. Id. at 552-55. The Commissioner found support for
this conclusion in section 2(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(2) (imposing responsibilities and
rights on employees to achieve safe working conditions) and in section 5(b), id. § 659(c)
(admonishing employees to obey OSHA standards and acknowledging that employees' misconduct could be the basis of a violation). Notwithstanding these sections,
the court examined sections 9(a) and 10(a), id. §§ 658(a), 659(a) (1970) (referring to the
issuance of citations and notifications of proposed penalties only to employer), section
10(c), id. § 659(c) (allowing employee intervention in the contesting of a citation only
after the employer has filed a notice of contest), and the legislative history pertinent

to section 5(b), concluding that OSHA could be enforced only against employers. 534

F.2d at 555. There is no case support for Commissioner Van Namee's thesis and much
opinion to the contrary. For a partial list of commentators who have agreed with the
court's conclusion, see Greenberg, supra note 20, at 106; Morey, supra note 52, at 584;
Silberman, The OccupationalSafety and Health Act: Major Policy Issues, 23 LAB. L.J.
504, 508-09 (1972); Stender, An OSHA Perspective and Prospective, 26 LAB. L.J. 71, 75
(1975); Comment, supra note 20, at 1006.
58. 534 F.2d at 553.
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discipline or discharge those employees who failed to comply; 59 2) to bargain
collectively for the right to discharge or discipline noncomplying employees;6 0 3) to petition the Secretary for a variance from the standard6' or
an extension of time within which to comply. 62 Because petitioners had
failed to show that they did or attempted to do any of these alternatives, 63
the court held that as a matter of law, petitioners failed to establish the
infeasibility of the hardhat standard, the standard was valid as applied, and
the Secretary could enforce such standard.6 4 The court therefore dismissed
65
petitioners' petition for review.
Factual distinctions between Atlantic & Gulf on the one hand, and
National Realty66 and Hanovia Lamp 67 on the other, as well as the
68
procedural rather than doctrinal bases upon which those latter cases rest,
warranted the court's refusal to equate employees' wilful misconduct with
unpreventable violations. 69 Considered in a vacuum, the suggested means of
prevention firing noncomplying employees - was "demonstrably
feasible."7 0
The documented repercussions 7 likely to occur when such preventive
measures are taken, however, and the court's insistence that employers
pursue measures which, although likely futile, could nonetheless be
employed, served to underscore the generally held view that employers and employers only - will be accountable for OSHA violations.7 2 It is
submitted that the ways suggested by the court for an employer to establish

59. Id. at 555.
60. Id. The court sought to underscore the effectiveness of this measure in
deterring concerted employee work stoppages. It argued that since occupational safety
and health would qualify as a subject of mandatory collective bargaining, the
employer could insist upon the right to discharge or discipline obdurate employees
without breaching its obligation to bargain in good faith, under the doctrine of NLRB
v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952). 534 F.2d at 555. If a work stoppage
nonetheless resulted, the court maintained, the presence of a no-strike or grievancearbitration contractual provision would render injunctive relief available under Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). 534 F,2d at 555.
61. 534 F.2d at 555, citing 29 U.S.C. § 655(d) (1970).
62. 534 F.2d at 555, citing 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1970).
63. 534 F.2d at 555-56.
64. Id. at 556.
65. Id.
66. See notes 24-31 and accompanying text supra.
67. See notes 32-34 and accompanying text supra.
68. In both cases, the court based its conclusion on the fact that the Secretary did
not meet his burden of proof. See notes 30 & 34 supra.
69. The court also presented persuasive arguments for its determination that it
had jurisdiction to consider the validity of a safety standard in an enforcement
proceeding. See notes 46-52 and accompanying text supra. There does not appear to
be any authority to the contrary and at least one circuit has reached the same
conclusion based solely on its interpretation of legislative history. See Arkansas-Best
Freight Sys., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 529 F.2d 649 (8th
Cir. 1976). See also Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n (Santa
Fe Transport Co.), 505 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1974); Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Brennan,
497 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1974).
70. See notes 29, 34 & 40-45 and accompanying text supra.
71. See notes 12 & 40 supra.
72. See note 57 supra.
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73
that the economically feasible steps had been taken to prevent violations
seem in this instance an exaltation of form over substance. It is unlikely
that even if the petitioners had collectively bargained for the right to
discharge or dismiss violating employees, or had sought a variance or an
abatement from the Secretary, the longshoremen would have more readily
donned their hardhats.74 This emphasis on external affirmative acts may
prove to be the legacy of Atlantic & Gulf; the case seems to propose that
despite the apparent futility of an enforcement effort, such effort must be
made before the Commission
or a court will be persuaded that an employer
75

has done all he can.

A question remains concerning the role of OSHA in the collective
bargaining process. The opinion is not clear as to whether an employer
should bargain for his employees' generic compliance with OSHA, including
applicable standards promulgated after the collective bargaining agreement
is concluded, or whether the bargaining should be more specifically
73. See notes 59-62 and accompanying text supra.
74. The employers were fearful of wildcat strikes and work stoppages, i.e.,
activities not authorized by the union. It should be noted that the union's "lukewarm
support" for the hardhat standard, 534 F.2d at 545, would not render the concerted
acts of employees official. See W. Addition Community Org. v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917,
926 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Western Contracting Corp. v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 893, 979 (10th Cir.
1963). Thus a collective bargaining agreement which specifically mentions employees'
obligation to comply with OSHA would be no greater protection from employees'
activities unsanctioned by the union.
If instead, official union action was anticipated, the specificity of the contract
would again be of little significance. The opinion indicated that the existing contract
contained a grievance-arbitration procedure. 534 F.2d at 546. This presumably was
accompanied by a no-strike clause, but even were it not, "the agreement to arbitrate
and the duty not to strike should be construed as having coterminous application."
Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 382 (1974). Since Gateway Coal, injunctions

against strikes in violation of an express no-strike clause, first allowed in Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), have also been permitted
where the no-strike clause was implied. The applicability of a Boys Markets
injunction would turn on whether discharge of an employee for violation of the
hardhat standard was an arbitrable dispute. The principal court apparently presumed

it would be. See 534 F.2d at 545 n.6. If the employees' duty to comply with OSHA were

expressly incorporated into the contract along with a grievance-arbitration procedure
and a no-strike clause, the remedies available to an employer upon an official strike
would remain the same.

Alternatively, if the petitioners had taken the court's advice and sought a
variance pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 655(d) (1970), it is unlikely that they would have
succeeded. Legislative history reveals that "[t]he economic implications of a standard
for an employer are not to be considered in the determination as to whether a variance
is to be allowed." LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
ACT OF 1970, at 1201 (1971).
Given the reasons for the OSHA violations, it is doubtful that an extension of

the time allowed for their abatement, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §659(c), would have
enabled the petitioners to persuade the longshoremen to comply with the hardhat

standard.

75. The court would probably not agree with the severity of this characterization

of its holding. The court did state that it was authorized to "take into account the fact
that employee intransigence in spite of employer's best efforts would make
enforcement inequitable" and that "in such a case we could deny or limit
enforcement." 534 F.2d at 555. Given the record of employer efforts to get the
longshoremen to wear hardhats, id. at 545, it is submitted that this case might well

have been a situation in which enforcement was inequitable.
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concerned with existing standards for which employee recalcitrance is
expected. The former possibility would appear to be departure from prior
case law which considered an employer liable only for foreseeable employee
misconduct. 76 If, on the other hand, Atlantic & Gulf is read to compel an
employer to bargain only with respect to existing standards, the scope of its
impact remains uncertain: to what extent must an employer have the means
to foresee widespread employee disregard of a safety standard, and to what
level must the risk of such potential employee recalcitrance rise before an
employer will be bound to safeguard against such noncompliance at the
collective bargaining table?
Atlantic & Gulf, therefore, represents a significant departure from the
underlying philosophy enunciated in National Realty and other decisions
that attempted to limit employer liability for OSHA violations resulting
directly from wilful employee misconduct. Its effect will be to impose on
employers a task usually assumed by labor - the obligation to place safety
considerations on the collective bargaining table.7
Robert E. Greshes
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NLRB v. Bernard Gloekler North East Co. (1976)
On October 25, 1972, an independent labor organization known as
Employee Representatives (Representatives) voted without National Labor
Relations Board (Board) supervision to affiliate with the preexisting United
Auto Workers Local 1461 (UAW local).' Shortly after this vote, the UAW
76. Cape & Vineyard Divs. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 512
F.2d 1148, 1152 (1st Cir. 1975).
77. There is a general presumption that occupational safety was of primary
concern to employees and of interest to employers only to the extent that a good safety
record affected an employer's insurance and workmen's compensation rates. See, e.g.,
Cohen, The Occupational Safety and Health Act: A Labor Lawyer's Overview, 33
OHIO ST. L.J. 788, (1972); Comment OccupationalSafety: A New Dimension in LaborManagement Relations, 25 SYRACUSE L. REV. 838 (1974); FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT
SERVICE, JOB SAFETY AND HEALTH

§ 9.25 (1976).

1. NLRB v. Bernard Gloekler N. E. Co., 540 F.2d 197, 198 (3d Cir. 1976). This
vote followed two earlier attempts by Dominic Cassesa, an international representative of the UAW, to enable the employees of Bernard Gloekler North East Company to
join the UAW. Id. In February 1972, Cassesa filed a charge with the Board's Regional
Director alleging that the company had violated Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1970), by dominating and interfering with the
organization and administration of representatives. 540 F.2d at 198. The Regional
Director found no evidence to support this charge, and his determination was upheld
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local informed respondent Bernard Gloekler North East Company (Gloekler)
that an existing collective bargaining agreement between Representatives
and Gloekler would be honored. 2 Gloekler refused to recognize the UAW
local, insisting that Representatives was the bargaining agent of the
employees.:' The UAW local filed charges of unfair labor practices against
Gloekler before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who found violations
of sections 8(a)(1) 4 and 8(a)(5) 5 of the National Labor Relations Act (Act).6
The AJ concluded, however, that since the UAW local was succeeded by
Representatives as of the February 24, 1973, disaffiliation vote, no order was
necessary to remedy these violations.7 The Board disagreed with the ALU's
recommendation ordering Gloekler to recognize and bargain with the UAW
local." Upon Gloekler's refusal to comply with the order, the Board
petitioned for enforcement." The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit 1' refused to enforce the Board's order, holding that because of
changes in the union's locus of power and in its economic options, Gloekler
had no duty to bargain with the UAW local since the affiliation vote of
October 25 raised a question of representation. NLRB v. Bernard Gloekler
North East Co., 540 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1976).
The policy underlying the National Labor Relations Act 1 is the
promotion of industrial peace through negotiation between employers and
the accredited representative of a group of employees.12 To encourage this
when appealed to the Office of the General Counsel. Id. Cassesa then petitioned the
Regional Director for a certification election to determine the exclusive bargaining
agent for the Gloekler employees, but the contract bar rule prevented the Board from
acting affirmatively upon the petition. Id.; see notes 19 & 20 and accompanying text
infra.
2. Bernard Gloekler N. E. Co., 217 N.L.R.B. 626 (1975).
3. Id. Thereafter, on February 24, 1973, the employees voted to disaffiliate with
the UAW local in order to negotiate through the Bernard Gloekler Committed, an
organization which was identical to the former Representatives. Id.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970). This section provides: "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer . . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title .... " Id. Section 157
grants to employees the right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing. See id. § 157.
5. Id. § 158(a)(5) (1970). This section provides: "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer ... to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title." Id.
6. 217 N.L.R.B. at 626.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 628.
9. NLRB v. Bernard Gloekler N. E. Co., 540 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1976).
10. The case was heard by Judges Biggs, Gibbons, and Hunter. Judge Biggs
wrote the opinion of the court.
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1970).
12. Id. § 151. Section 151 provides in pertinent part:
The denial by some employers of the right of the employees to organize and
the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining
lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife and unrest, which have the
intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce ....
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce ... by encouraging
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining ....
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system of collective bargaining, the Act requires the employer to bargain in
good faith with the representative selected by a majority of the employees in
an appropriate bargaining unit. 13 A tension sometimes arises between the
14
aim of industrial stability and the Act's policy of majority representation
since frequent changes in the designated bargaining representative, even if
reflective of employee sentiment, would disrupt the employer-employee
relationship. 1
The conflict between these opposing statutory goals has resulted in the
Board's adoption of a set of rules which places certain restrictions on
employees' free choice by limiting the frequency of representational
challenges in order to promote stability in bargaining relationships. 16 Under
ordinary circumstances, an election petition filed within twelve months of a
union's certification 17 by the Board as the exclusive bargaining representative of a unit of employees is deemed untimely.' 8 Similarly, when a union
13. Id. §§ 158(a)(5), 159(a). For the text of section 158(a)(5), see note 5 supra. The
duty to bargain collectively must be read in conjunction with section 158(d) of the Act.
This section defines collective bargaining as "the performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment ..
" 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970). The Board must
decide on "the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining." Id. § 159(b);
see Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1401, 1403 (1958),
wherein the author suggests that the duty to bargain in good faith may lead to
government regulation of the collective bargaining process.
14. See Cushman, The Durationof Certifications by the NationalLabor Relations
Board and the Doctrine of Administrative Stability, 45 MICH. L. REV. 1, 37-38 (1946).
15. See Note, The Bargaining Obligations of Successor Employers, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 759, 761 (1975). For example, an employer might use delaying tactics in the hope
that the union's majority would dissipate. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 100
(1954).
16. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE

BARGAINING ch. 4, § 7 (1976). For a recapitulation of these rules, see Brooks v. NLRB,
348 U.S. 96, 98-99 (1954). See also 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970). For the text of this
section, see note 20 infra.
17. A board certification has been defined as "a statement of fact that the union
has been designated by a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit as their
bargaining representatives and that it is the exclusive bargaining representative of
all the employees in such unit." Hearings before the Special Committee to Investigate
Executive Agencies on the War Labor Board and the NationalLabor Relations Board,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1222 (1945). For a discussion of the certifications bar's
contribution to the doctrine of administrative stability, see Cushman, supra note 13.
18. This denial is known as a "certification bar." See, e.g., Brooks v. NLRB, 348
U.S. 96 (1954). In Brooks, the Supreme Court held that "the Board's view that the oneyear period [during which an election petition should be dismissed] should run from
the date of certification rather than the date of election seems within the allowable
area of the Board's discretion ....
Id. at 104. Under ordinary circumstances, the
certification will be valid for a reasonable period of time - usually about one year.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 61 N.L.R.B. 90, 92 (1945). Unusual circumstances have been
found in three situations. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 98-99 (1954). The first
instance existed when a certified union had become defunct. See, e.g., Public Serv.
Elec. & Gas Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 325 (1944). The second situation arose upon a transfer of
affiliation as a result of a schism. See, e.g., Brightwater Paper Co., 54 N.L.R.B. 1102
(1944). The Gloekler court commented that "in our case, there has been no serious
allegation of schism." 540 F.2d at 203 n.10. The third unusual circumstance occured
when the size of the bargaining unit fluctuated radically within a short time. See, e.g.,
Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 38 N.L.R.B. 404, 409 (1942).
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has acquired representative status through voluntary recognition by the
employer, the recognition
bar rule prevents challenges to the union for a
"reasonable time."' 9 An even greater limitation upon the employees'
freedom of choice is the contract bar rule, under which the Board may
dismiss as untimely an election petition filed during the term of an existing
20
collective bargaining agreement of reasonable duration.
The Board has express authority under section 9(c)(1) of the Act to
certify a union as the bargaining representative of the employees. 2'
Although there are no specific provisions in the Act relating to amendment
of certification, the Board has held, with Supreme Court approval,2 2 that its
express authority to issue certifications under section 9(c)(1) implies an
authority to police its certifications by amendment or clarification in order
to effectuate the policies of the Act. 23 The filing of a petition under section
9(b)24 of the Act is the accepted method of instituting amendment of
certification procedures, 25 and the Board's contract bar rule does not apply
to such an amendment. 28 Strict limitations have been placed upon the
amendment of certification procedure because it was not intended to
substitute for other procedures provided by the Act. 27 Petitions involving a
mere name change present no problem and are often handled by stipulation
of the parties. 2 However, when the amendment involves a change in the
19. See, e.g., NLRB v. Cyauga Crushed Stone, Inc. 474 F.2d Cir. 1970); Freeman
Co., 194 N.L.R.B. 595, 598 (1971), rev'd in part sub noma., NLRB v. Freeman Co., 471
F.2d 708 (8th Cir. 1972).
20. See, e.g., General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962); American Seating
Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 250 (1953). For a discussion of the contract bar doctrine before
American Seating, see Note, Change of Status of a Party to a Collective Labor
Agreement, 60 YALE L.J. 1026, 1033-36 (1951).

21. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970). This section states in pertinent part: "If the Board

finds upon the record ... that such a question of representation exists, it shall direct
an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof." Id.
22. See Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964), in which the Court
stated that "the unions ... might petition the Board under § 9(c)(1) to obtain a
clarification of the certificates they already have from the Board; and the employer
might do the same." Id. at 267.
23. Bell Tel. Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 371, 373 (1957); accord, Daily Press, Inc., 110
N.L.R.B. 573 (1954); Amperex Elec. Corp., 109 N.L.R.B. 353 (1954); United Aircraft
Corp., 108 N.L.R.B. 52 (1954).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970). This section provides in part that "[t]he Board shall
decide in each case . .

. ,

in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in

exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining .

. . ."

Id.

25. See NLRB R. & Reg., 29 C.F.R. § 102.60(b) (1976).
26. East Dayton Tool & Die Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 577, 579 (1971); see Hamilton Tool
Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 571 (1971); A.O. Smith Corp., 166 N.L.R.B. 845 (1967); Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 162 N.L.R.B. 768 (1967).
27. See Gulf Oil Corp., 135 N.L.R.B. 184 (1962). The Board held that "[tihe Act
and the Board's policy . . .require that [a question concerning representation] be
determined through a petition and secret ballot of the employees concerned." Id. at
185 (footnote omitted); accord, R.M. Hollingshead Corp., 111 N.L.R.B. 840 (1955);
Weatherhead Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1266 (1953); Wagner Elec. Corp., 91 N.L.R.B. 220
(1950).
28. See e.g., Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 2604/262 & n.6 (1963). For a

discussion of amendment and clarification procedures, see Goske, Clarifications of
Bargaining Units and Amendments to Certifications, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 988.
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affiliation, function, or structure of the bargaining agent, the petition must
be dismissed if it29 raises a "question concerning representation." 30 This rule
is also determinative of the employer's continuing obligation to bargain. The
Board's
test of survival of bargaining obligation in each case is whether the
successor organization continues to constitute ... the "representative[s]
of [the employees'] own choosing." (Section 7 of the Act.) The industrial
stability sought by the Act would unnecessarily be disrupted if every
union organizational adjustment were to result in displacement of the
3
employer-bargaining representative relationship. 1
Under this approach, the Board has focused upon such factors as the
representation of the same unit of employees by the new union, 32 the results
of an affiliation election, 33 the continuation of the same officers,34 the
certified union's opposition to amendment,35 and the continuation of the
collective bargaining agreement.3 6 The Board advocates that "[e]mployees,
seeking to secure more effective and economical representation, may
combine to form a larger and more potent labor organization. 3 7 Consistent
with the Board's approach, the courts have conditioned enforcement of a
Board order amending certification upon a finding that the "new union [is] a
continuation of the old union - [rather than] a substantially different
organization. '38 The courts have sought, as has the Board, to ensure against
"a substantial departurefrom the rights and duties of the local's members
'3 9
and their officers.

29. See Crucible Steel Casting, 162 N.L.R.B. 1513 (1967); General Elec. Co., 160

N.L.R.B. 504 (1966); Beaunit Fibers, Inc., 153 N.L.R.B. 987 (1965).

30. A question concerning representation exists when a labor organization (or
individual) seeks recognition as the bargaining agent of the employees and the
employer declines to recognize it.

THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE

AcT 153-54 (C. Morris ed. 1971).
31. Canton Sign Co., 174 N.L.R.B. 906, 908-09 (1969), enf. denied on other
grounds, 457 F.2d 832 (6th Cir. 1972).
COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

32. See 174 N.L.R.B. at 908.
33. See East Dayton Tool & Die Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 577 (1971).
34. See Equipment Mfg., Inc., 174 N.L.R.B. 19 (1969).

35. See Missouri Beef Packers, Inc., 175 N.L.R.B. 1100 (1969).
36. See Prudential Ins. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 237 (1953).
37. Canton Sign Co., 174 N.L.R.B. 906, 908 (1969), enf. denied on other grounds,
457 F.2d 832 (6th Cir. 1972).
38. Carpinteria Lemon Ass'n v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 554, 557 (9th Cir. 1956) (citation
omitted), cert. denied 354 U.S. 909 (1957); accord, NLRB v. Commercial Letter, Inc.,

496 F.2d 35, 39 (8th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Hershey Chocolate Corp., 297 F.2d 286 (3d Cir.
1961); NLRB v. Harris-Woodson Co., 179 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1950); Continental Oil Co.
v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 473 (10th Cir. 1940), modified and remanded, 313 U.S. 212 (1941).
39. American Bridge Div., United States Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 660, 664
(3d Cir. 1972) (emphasis added), accord, Retail Store Employees v. NLRB, 528 F.2d
1225 (9th Cir. 1975). For examples of cases where the courts have used the continuity

of representation reasoning in concluding that there was no "substantial departure,"

see NLRB v. Pearl Bookbinding Co., 517 F.2d 1108 (1st Cir. 1975); NLRB v.
Newspapers, Inc., 515 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Commercial Letter, Inc., 496
F.2d 35 (8th Cir. 1974).
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The Gloekler court's analysis examined the criteria relevant to
40
determine whether the affiliation vote raised a question of representation.
Despite the absence of a certified union, the Third Circuit found that the
policy considerations raised by the case at bar were identical to those in an
amendment situation and therefore that amendment precedent should be
examined for guidance.4 1 Specifically, the court cited American Bridge
Division, U.S. Steel Corp. v.NLRB,42 where a certified independenf union
had sought affiliation with the United Steelworkers of America (USW). 4 3 In
American Bridge, the Third Circuit had refused to enforce an order issued by
the Board against the employer for failing td bargain with the USW,
reasoning that the transfer of important powers to the officers of the USW
International might raise serious discontent among the employees because
the USW International was responsible for the interests of its 1,120,000
members rather than solely for the interests of the original independent
union members. 4' The Gloekler court found such reasoning persuasive,
noting that the employer in the instant case "would be facing a markedly
different contractual partner if the UAW were to represent the employees.' 45
Although the Gloekler court framed the issue in the traditional context
of whether the "record contained substantial evidence to support a finding
of continuity of the same representation,"' 6 the court extended the
conventional inquiry from mere consideration of the union's locus of power
to an examination of its economic options. 4 7 The Gloekler court stressed the
prior existence of the UAW local, indicating that the affiliation would
substantially alter the union's locus of power. 48 As examples of this change,
the court observed that the UAW would exercise substantial authority over
the grievance procedure 49 and "the employees' power to strike would be
40. 540 F.2d at 198.
41. Id. at 201. Judge Biggs stated that the Board never addressed the issue of how
the representation of the UAW local might differ from that of Representatives. Id. at
200. At the hearing before the AIJ, Gloekler had attempted to introduce evidence
pertaining to the nature of the representation provided by the UAW local and the
international UAW. Id. at 199. This evidence was excluded as irrelevant. Id. at 200.
The Board never addressed Gloekler's specific objections to these exclusions. Id.
42. 457 F.2d 660 (3d Cir. 1972).
43. Id. at 662-63.
44. Id. at 664.
45. 540 F.2d at 201. In arriving at this determination, the court found the material
excluded by the ALJ to be relevant. Id. See notes 48 & 49 and accompanying text
infra.
46. 540 F.2d at 200. Such a factual determination is initially made by the Board,
and the court is precluded by statute from reexamining the decision if it is supported
by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970); see NLRB
v. Commercial Letter, Inc., 496 F.2d 35, 39 (8th Cir. 1974); Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1951).
47. See 540 F.2d at 201-03.
48. Id. at 202.
49. Id. The material excluded from the hearing before the ALJ indicated that
several provisions regarding the resolution of employee grievances were included in
the UAW local's bylaws. Id. at 199. Article 19 of these bylaws directed the UAW
local's executive board to "assess the 'validity' of cases which [appeared] to require
arbitration. Article 12 define[d] requirements for shop officers within the UAW local."
Id. The UAW local's executive board was permitted by article 6 to act for the
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removed by the UAW's international constitution. 50° Further, the economic
power of Gloekler's employees might be augmented by the membership and
resources of the UAW, which could be used to support the employees during
a strike.51 Thus, Gloekler would be dealing with a union with significantly
different economic options.5 2 As a result of this change in the employees'
economic options and in the locus of power, the Third Circuit held that the
attempted affiliation was actually a "palpable change of representation,"
relieving Gloekler of its obligation to bargain. 53
To the extent that the Gloekler court relied on the determination that the
locus of power would be altered, it remained consistent with the Board's
position,5 4 with other circuit court decisions,5 5 and with its own American
Bridge decision,5 6 in- examining the continuity of representation from the
employees' perspective.5 7 However, the court departed from traditional
58
analysis and placed more emphasis on the perspective of the employer
when it shifted its focus to the potential change in the local's economic
options.59 Writing for the court, Judge Biggs found a question of representation arising not because of the absence of a continuity of representation but
because Gloekler "would be facing a markedly, different contractual
partner.'60 This new criteria advanced by the Gloekler court may upset the
balance sought by the Board between the Act's twin statutory goals membership when urgent business so required. Id. The-court also concluded that the
UAW bylaws could affect the autonomy of the employee grievance committee which
had been designated by name in the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
at 202.
50. Id. Article 50, section 4 of the excluded UAW constitution required the assent
of the executive board or the president of the international, before a local could call a

strike. Id. at 200. Article 50, section 8 authorized the executive board to call a strike by
a two-thirds vote when the existence of the international was at stake, subject to the
approval of the entire membership. Id.

51. Id. at 201-02. The court observed that in the past the UAW international had
aided the UAW local with strike benefits. Id. at 202.
52. Id.
53. Id. The court concluded its analysis by distinguishing its earlier decision in

NLRB v. Hershey Chocolate Corp., 297 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1961), in which the Third
Circuit had permitted a local of one international union to enforce a clause in an
existing contract after the union had disaffiliated and joined a new international. 540

F.2d at 203. The Gloekler court perceived no threat in Hershey Chocolate to the

preservation of "industrial stability under existing contracts" since the employer had
not objected to the change in the local's affiliation. Id. Therefore, any change in the
local's economic options or in its locus of power was unimportant, rendering the
Hershey Chocolate case inapposite to the instant case. Id.
54. See text accompanying notes 31-36 supra.
55. See text accompanying notes 37 & 38 supra.
56. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.

57. Even the Third Circuit had previously focused upon the rights of a union's
members. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.

58. The court's inquiry into the UAW local's economic options was beneficial to
Gloekler because, by preventing a change in the local's economic options, the court

had substantially frozen the bargaining power of the local for the duration of the
collective bargaining agreement.
59. See notes 50 & 51 and accompanying text supra.
60. 540 F.2d at 201 (emphasis added). In the context of the opinion, it is somewhat
unclear whether both increased economic options and transfer of power need be
present for a finding of a "markedly different contractual partner." See Id. at 201-02.
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industrial stability and majority representation - by further restricting
employees' free choice 6' when a union's economic position is enhanced,
despite the continuity of the same representation.
Furthermore, the Gloekler court's use of American Bridge as support for
its decision 62 is misleading when applied to the economic options analysis.
The American Bridge court did stress the significance of the change in size
when a small local associates with an international organization of over one
million members.6 3 However, the increase in size supported the court's
64
finding of a "change in the fulcrum of union control and representation,"
rather than as may be implied from Gloekler, a finding that the increase in
size enhanced the union's economic position vis-A-vis the employer.6 5
To the extent that the Gloekler court considered the "fulcrum of union
control and representation,"6 6 it is in accord with the traditional procedure
7
of simply determining the existence of a continuity of representation.
However, the extension of the court's inquiry into a union's economic
options may tend to undermine what the Third Circuit has acknowledged to
be "the overriding policy of the Act ... in favor of the interest in employees
to be represented by a representative of their own choosing for the purposes
'6 8
of collective bargaining.
The undermining of this policy may be limited if the Third Circuit
restricts Gloekler to situations in which the prospective union would alter
the locus of power and reinforce the employees' economic position.6 9
However, since the Third Circuit could have easily avoided its discussion of
different economic options by restriciting itself solely to the traditional
analysis, 70 the court may be implying that an employer can refuse to
bargain solely because a union has increased its economic strength through
affiliation. 71 At the very least, Gloekler announces the Third Circuit's
deemphasis of the Board's decision in Canton Sign Company,72 reserving to
employees the unfettered right to "combine to form a larger and more potent
labor organization. '73
Richard W. Schey
61. See notes 15-19 & 26 and accompanying text supra.
62. 540 F.2d at 201.
63. 457 F.2d at 664.

64. Id.
65. See 540 F.2d at 201.
66. Id. at 202.
67. See notes 30-38 and accompanying text supra.
68. NLRB v. Western & S. Life Ins. Co., 391 F.2d 119, 123 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 978 (1968).
69. However, such an analysis might have significantly increased Gloekler's
burden by requiring it to prove both a change in the union's economic options and its
locus of power in order to sever his bargaining obligation.
70. The court did conclude that the affiliation changed the union's locus of power.
Id. at 202.
71. See text accompanying note 60 supra. This conclusion is supported by the
court's discussion of Hershey Chocolate, distinguished because "[a]ny change in the
local's economic options or in its locus of power was not of importance ...
" 540 F.2d
at 203 (emphasis added).
72. 174 N.L.R.B. 906 (1969), enf. denied on other grounds, 457 F.2d 832 (6th Cir.
1972).
73. Id. at 908; see note 36 and accompanying text supra.
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INJUNCTIONS - A PROSPECTIVE Boys Markets INJUNCTION
MAY PROHIBIT ONLY VIOLATIONS LIKELY TO OCCUR AND MUST SPECIFY

LABOR LAW -

STEPS TO BE TAKEN TO AVOID VIOLATIONS.

United States Steel Corp. v. UMW,(1976)

After members of Local 1248 of the United Mine Workers of America
(Local) staged a number of short-lived wildcat strikes1 at United States Steel
Corporation's (U.S. Steel) mining complex in Washington County, Pennsylvania, 2 U.S. Steel brought suit against the United Mine Workers of America
(UMW), District No. 5 of the UMW (District), and the Local (collectively, the
unions) seeking a preliminary injunction prohibiting future work stoppages
by members of the Local. 3 The United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania issued the injunction, framing it in the language of
the collective bargaining agreement then in effect between the UMW and
the mine operators. 4 On appeal,5 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit 6 vacated the injunction order and remanded the case to the
1. A wildcat strike is a strike unauthorized by proper union procedure. See
Campbell v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 70 F. Supp. 996, 1002 (W.D. Pa. 1947).
2. United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 534 F.2d 1063, 1067-68 (3d Cir. 1976). The
work stoppages that precipitated the order occurred between February 12, 1975, and
February 25, 1975. They concerned the union members' demand for a permanent
security guard in the complex's parking lot, a refusal to work with a fellow member
who had crossed a picket line during a previous work stoppage, and a dispute over a
member's job assignment. Id.
3. United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 393 F. Supp. 936 (W.D. Pa: 1975). The
district court had granted U.S. Steel's requests for temporary restraining orders in
separate actions after each strike had begun. In the first, union members returned to
their jobs only after the district court found the local in contempt and imposed a
conditional fine, which was suspended when the members returned to work. 534 F.2d
at 1067-68.
In each action, U.S. Steel proceeded under section 301 of the LaborManagement Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970). Section 301
provides: "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or . . . the
citizenship of the parties." Id. The applicability of this section to actions by an
employer to end an unauthorized strike by a union was established by Boys Markets
v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), noted in 16 VILL. L. REV. 176 (1970).
For discussion of this case, see notes 23 & 24 and accompanying text infra.
4. The district court's order provided in relevant part:
1. [A] Preliminary Injunction is hereby issued enjoining the defendants ...
from
(a) Engaging in a strike or work stoppage .

.

. or

(b) Picketing or in any other manner interfering with operations at the
plaintiffs Maple Creek Mine located in Washington County, Pennsylvania,
because of any difference concerning the meaning and application of the
provisions of the Agreement or any difference about matters not specifically
mentioned in the Agreement or because of any local trouble of any kind
arising at the mine.
393 F. Supp. at 941.
5. Two separate work stoppages, occurring respectively on February 12 and
February 24, 1975, were enjoined by the district court in two separate actions brought
by U.S. Steel on those dates. The Third Circuit consolidated the two cases in a single
appeal. 534 F.2d at 1066 n.2.
6. The case was heard by Chief Judge Seitz and Judges Rosenn and Gibbons.
Judge Gibbons delivered the opinion for the court, and Judge Rosenn concurred in a
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district court, holding, inter alia,7 that although a prospective injunction
could properly issue against the unions, the particular injunction issued was
both overbroad and insufficiently specific.8 United States Steel Corp. v.
UMW, 534 F.2d 1063 (3d Cir.), rehearingdenied,9 534 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir.
1976).
In order to aid nascent labor unions, Congress in 1932 passed the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 10 which prohibited federal courts from enjoining
certain conduct of labor unions." Subsequently, in response to significant
increases in union power, Congress passed the Labor Management
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act),' 2 which restored to federal courts some of

separate opinion. Chief Judge Seitz concurred in part and dissented in part, also in a
separate opinion.
7. The court also found the injunction defective because it did not order the
plaintiff-employer to arbitrate the disputes as a condition to injunctive relief. Such a
direction, the Third Circuit noted, has been required by the United States Supreme
Court. 534 F.2d at 1078, citing Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S.
235 (1970), quoting Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The Third Circuit held that "[i]f the court orders a prospective injunction
such as United States Steel here seeks, it should include an order directing compliance
with the settlement of disputes clause at least as broad, and for the same period, as
the injunction." 534 F.2d at 1079.
8. 534 F.2d at 1078. The district court's order was found to be overbroad because
it went further than seemed to be necessary from the pattern of violations. Id. at 1077.
The Third Circuit agreed with defendants' notice-vagueness objection under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d), emphasizing that "any prospective injunctive
decree must tell the local what steps it must take to prevent illegal work stoppages
from recurring and must tell the parent organization what prophylactic steps it must
take to assure that the local fulfills its contractual obligation." Id. at 1078.
9. The Third Circuit, although conceding that "in banc consideration ordinarily
would be appropriate," nonetheless denied defendants' petition for rehearing, stating
that only the Supreme Court could resolve the conflict among the circuits with respect
to "the application of the federal law of labor arbitration to the same national'.labor
contract." Id. at 1084-85. The court noted that a petition for certiorari had been filed
seeking review of United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 519 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1975), and
declared that rehearing en banc might hinder such considerations. 534 F.2d at 1078.
The Supreme Court, however, eventually denied the petition. United States Steel Corp.
v. UMW, 96 S.Ct. 3221 (1976).
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1970).
11. In the early 20th century, employers frequently obtained broadly worded
injunctions prohibiting most union organizing activities. See Boys Markets v. Retail
Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 250 (1970); F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR
INJUNCTION (1930). The Norris-LaGuardia Act provides in part:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out
of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested
in such dispute . . .from ...

(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment;
(d) By all lawful means aiding any person participating in or interested in
any labor dispute who is being proceeded against in ...any action or suit in any
court of the United States or of any State;
(f) Assembling peacefully to act or to organize to act in promotion of their
interests in a labor dispute; . . .

29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1970).
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13
the jurisdiction eliminated by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Through the
judiciary, a national labor policy gradually developed favoring the quick
14
and peaceful settlement of labor disputes through arbitration. In Sinclair
5
Refining Co. v. Atkinson,' however, the Supreme Court emphasized that
section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act had not impliedly repealed the NorrisLaGuardia Act's prohibition of labor injunctions, even where the operative
18
bargaining agreement contained a compulsory arbitration clause. Subse7
quent decisions, leading to similarly anomalous results,' compelled the

13. As the national economy changed from that of the Depression to the postwar
boom of the late 1940's, the Republican-controlled 80th Congress became concerned
over the rapidly increasing number of strikes called by unions in major industries.
Comment, The Return of the Strike Injunction, 51 B.U. L. REV. 665, 666 (1971). The
Taft-Hartley Act was passed over President Truman's veto. 20 L.R.R.M. 22 (1947). It
allows injunctions to issue prohibiting certain "unfair" labor practices.
14. In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), the Supreme
Court affirmed the entry of an order requiring an employer to arbitrate certain
grievances as provided in the collective bargaining agreement between the employer
and the union. The Court relied on section 301 of the Taft Hartley Act (see note 3
supra) to express its view of what the federal labor policy should be. The Court
explained:
Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for
an agreement not to strike. Viewed in this light, the legislation does more than
confer jurisdiction in the federal courts over labor organizations. It expresses a
federal policy that federal courts should enforce these agreements on behalf of or
againstlabor organizations and that industrial peace can be best obtained only in
that way.
353 U.S. at 455 (emphasis added).
Three years later, in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593 (1960), United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960), and United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), popularly
known as the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Court found that "[t]he present federal policy
is to promote industrial stabilization through the collective bargaining agreement."
363 U.S. at 578, citing Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57
(1957). In the Court's view, arbitration was to be "[a] major factor in achieving
" 363 U.S. at 578. The Court made it clear that "[ain order to
industrial peace ..
arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with
positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation
that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage." Id.
at 582. See generally Comment, The Return of the Strike Injunction, 51 B.U. L. REV.
664, 667 (1971) discussing suggested limitations on the- coverage of injunctions
prohibiting work stoppages violative of the operative collective bargaining agreement,
popularly known as Boys Markets injunctions). For additional discussion of the
permissible breadth of such injunctions, see The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 192 (1970); Comment, The New Federal Law of Labor Injunctions, 79 YALE
L.J. 1593 (1970); Note, Prospective Boys Markets Injunctions, 90 HARV. L. REV. 790
(1977); Note, Labor Injunctions, Boys Markets, and the Presumption of Arbitrability,
85 HARV. L. REV. 636 (1971).
15. 370 U.S. 195 (1962), overruled in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770,

398 U.S. 235 (1970).

16. 37-0 U.S. at 203. This holding, combined with Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), left employers in the anomalous position of being
unable to enforce arbitration clauses against recalcitrant unions, while remaining
subject themselves to enforcement of the same clauses by unions acting on behalf of
employees. See note 14 supra.
17. In Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962), the Court held that section
301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act did not divest state courts of concurrent jurisdiction
over suits for violation of contracts between employers and the unions representing
employees. Id. at 507. However, the Court's decision in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735,
390 U.S. 557 (1968), rendered Dowd Box virtually meaningless. In Avco, an employer
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Court to reconsider Sinclair,'8 and in 1970, in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Local 770,19 the Court held that under certain conditions, 20 the
Norris-LaGuardia Act would not prohibit an injunction against a work
stoppage violative of a no-strike compulsory arbitration clause embodied in
21
a collective bargaining agreement.
Recent decisions in- the area of Boys Markets injunctions have
concerned the issue of whether such injunctions may be issued prospectively, and if so, how broad they may be in describing prohibited activities.
sued the union to which its employees belonged to enjoin a strike violative of the
collective bargaining agreement then in force. The state court granted an injunction
in an ex parte hearing. On removal, the federal district court, after asserting original
jurisdiction, dissolved the injunction. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 263 F. Supp. 177
(M.D. Tenn. 1967). The court of appeals and the Supreme Court affirmed. Avco Corp.
v. Aero Lodge 735, 376 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1967), aff'd, 390 U.S. 557 (1968). By holding
that an action brought under section 301 by an employer in a state court was subject
to removal to federal court, Avco encourages forum shopping among union
defendants, since such a dispute was controlled by federal substantive law, and
"removal is but one aspect of the primacy of the federal judiciary in deciding
questions of federal law . . . ." 390 U.S. at 560. In addition, the federal courts were
prohibited by Sinclair from granting relief otherwise available in state courts. 370
U.S. at 203-10. Employers were thus effectively deprived of injunctive relief even
against a union which had violated a no-strike provision of the operative collective
bargaining agreement, while unions could enforce a mandatory arbitration clause
even though such a provision was generally viewed as the consideration for a union's
agreement not to strike. Island Creek Coal Co. v. UMW, 507 F.2d 650, 653 (3d Cir.
1975); see 21 VILL. L. REv. at 610 n.20 (1976).
18. The Court, in Boys Markets, evidenced the following concern:
The principal practical effect of Avco and Sinclair taken together is nothing less
than to oust state courts of jurisdiction in § 301(a) suits where injunctive relief is
sought for breach of a no-strike obligation. Union defendants can, as a matter of
course, obtain removal to a federal court, and there is obviously a compelling
incentive for them to do so in order to gain the advantage of the strictures upon
injunctive relief which Sinclairimposes on federal courts. The sanctioning of this
practice, however, is wholly inconsistent with our conclusion in Dowd Box that
the congressional purpose embodied in § 301(a) was to supplement, and not to
encroach upon, the pre-existing jurisdiction of the state courts. It is ironic indeed
that the very provision that Congress clearly intended to provide additional
remedies for breach of collective-bargaining agreements has been employed to
displace previously existing state remedies. We are not at liberty thus to depart
from the clearly expressed congressional policy to the contrary.
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 244-45 (1970) (emphasis
supplied by the court).
19. 398 U.S. 235 (1970). In Boys Markets, the defendant union called a strike over
a work assignment rather than submit the dispute to arbitration. After the employer
obtained a temporary restraining order in state court, the union removed the case to
the federal district court, which granted a similar injunction. The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed, 416 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1969), holding that such relief was
barred by section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act under Sinclair. The Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals, holding that the Norris-LaGuardia Act would not
prohibit a section 301 order for binding arbitration of the grievance for which the
strike was called. 398 U.S. at 253.
20. The necessary conditions are: 1) the dispute must be over a grievance which
both parties are contractually bound to arbitrate, 2) the employer should be ordered to
arbitrate, and 3) the issuance of an injunction must be warranted under ordinary
principles of equity. 398 U.S. at 254.
21. Id. at 253. Any significance inherent in the fact that the collective bargaining
agreement under consideration in Boys Markets contained an express no-strike clause
was rendered nugatory in Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974). In that
case, the employees' union walked out over falsification, by three company foremen,
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While the Seventh Circuit has approved a prospective injunction framed as
broadly as the bargaining agreement itself,22 the Fifth Circuit has held that
Boys Markets calls for a case-by-case adjudication and therefore proscribes
all prospective injunctions.2 3 Alternatively, the Tenth Circuit has adopted
an intermediate position, approving a prospective injunction encompassing
2
only the violations that the district court found likely to occur. '
In addition to the split in authority regarding the availability of
prospective Boys Markets injunctions, another controversial area concerns
the extent of a union's responsibility for preventing and terminating
unauthorized strikes. The leading Third Circuit decision addressing this
25
problem is Eazor Express, Inc. v. InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters,
wherein the court held that the inclusion of an express no-strike provision in
of certain safety records, which permitted miners to continue to work in unsafe
conditions. The company suspended the foremen, and the miners returned to work.
When the company reinstated two of the foremen (the third having retired) after
receiving permission to do so from the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Resources, the miners walked out again. The company then obtained a preliminary
injunction under section 301 ordering the union to end the strike and to submit the
dispute to arbitration. Id. at 370-73.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and vacated
the injunction. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 466 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1972). The Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals, holding 1) that the dispute was covered by the
arbitration provision in the bargaining agreement; 2) that the duty to arbitrate gave
rise to an implied no-strike obligation; and 3) that the circumstances of the case
satisfied traditional equitable principles controlling the availability of injunctive
relief. 414 U.S. at 374. The Court found that the presumption of arbitrability
announced in the Steelworkers Trilogy applied to disputes found to be arbitrable for
purposes of a section 301 order. Id. at 379. The Court thus upheld a section 301
injunction obtained against a striking union local, even though the bargaining
agreement did not contain such a provision. Id. at 382. The Court stated that absent
an explicit negation of any no-strike obligation, "the agreement to arbitrate and the
agreement not to strike should be construed as having coterminous application." Id.
Similarly, in Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95
(1962), .the Court upheld an award of damages to an employer who had sustained
losses due to an unauthorized strike over an arbitrable grievance, reasoning that the
presence of a compulsory arbitration clause implied a no-strike agreement. Id. at 105.
22. The Seventh Circuit held, in Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Local 1487, UMW, 500 F.2d
950 (7th Cir. 1974), that the breadth of an injunction was to be determined by the
extent of the misconduct and that an injunction as broad as the agreement was
permissible. Id. at 953.
23. The Fifth Circuit, in United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 519 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir.
1975), found that a prospective injunction against strikes based on arbitrable
grievances and "local trouble of any kind" was violative of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d). 519 F.2d at 1245. However, the Third
Circuit noted that the Fifth Circuit seemed generally hostile to Boys Markets
injunctions. 534 F.2d at 1075, citing Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468
F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972).
24. In CF&I Steel Corp. v. UMW, 507 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1974), the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the issuance of an injunction that prohibited any "strike, work stoppage,
interruption of work, or picketing" at plaintiff's mine, over "disputes arising from
employee suspensions, employee discharges, and work assignments" for the duration
of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 173. The court found "no incapacitating
vagueness in the decree," stating that the applicability of the order was sufficiently
delineated, and that the terms of the order were "of reasonably specific content in the
'common law of the shop."' Id., quoting Cox, Reflections upon Labor Arbitration,72
HARv. L. RE-v. 1482, 1498-99 (1959).
25. 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 935, rehearingdenied, 425
U.S. 908 (1976).
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a collective bargaining agreement implied an obligation on the part of the
union to use "every reasonable means" to terminate an unauthorized strike
26
by its members.
To the extent that these issues were involved in the instant case,
however, the defendant unions contended, inter alia,27 that 1) since the work
stoppages were unauthorized, the Local, District, and UMW should not be
subject to the injunction; 2) even if a prospective injunction could be validly
issued, the particular injunction in question was overbroad; 2 and 3) the
particular injunction was "so vague as to be inconsistent with" Federal Rule
29
of Civil Procedure 65(d).
Rejecting the unions' contention that an "all reasonable efforts"
obligation could be' implied only from collective bargaining agreements
which contain express no strike clauses,30 Judge Gibbons, writing for the
26. 520 F.2d at 959. The court observed that "collective bargaining agreements

*

.

. impose a continuing day-to-day obligation on the parties to fulfill their terms in

good faith." Id.
27. The defendant unions also argued that a Boys Markets injunction was
improper since neither the disputes covered by the injunction nor the actual disputes
upon which the order was based were arbitrable within the terms of the 1974 collective
bargaining agreement. 534 F.2d at 1069. The basis for this argument seems to have
been that the Supreme Court's construction of the 1971 bargaining agreement as
implying a no-strike obligation in Gateway could not be relied upon because of the
inclusion in the 1974 agreement of the phrase, "Disputes arising under this agreement
shall be resolved as follows:" preceding the same grievance-arbitration arrangement
contained in the 1971 agreement. Id. at 1070. The unions claimed that the import of
this phrase was that grievance-arbitration was restricted to contract issues only,
excluding "local trouble" and "matters not specifically covered." Id. The court
concluded, however, that the language made no substantive change in the rights and
obligations of the parties and that Gateway still controlled interpretation of the
agreement. Id. at 1071. Thus, the court's finding that each of the three disputes
leading to the order from which the appeal was taken was "at least 'local trouble' of
some kind" within the language of the arbitration clause of the agreement was
dispositive of this argument. Id.
The unions further contended that the injunction which required them to
arbitrate failed to impose a corresponding obligation on the employer, and that the
employer had not shown that irreparable injury would ensue if the injunction were
not granted. Id. at 1067. The Third Circuit found no merit in the latter argument, id. at
1079, but did require that if the district court ordered a prospective injunction on
remand, "it should include an order directing compliance with the settlement of
disputes clause at least as broad, and for the same period, as the injunction. Id. at
1078-79.
28. See note 8 supra.
29. 534 F.2d at 1067. Rule 65(d) provides in part: "Every order granting an

injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance;
shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to
the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained. FED. R. Civ.
P. 65(d); see note 8 supra.
30. Judge Gibbons, relying on Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974),
first found a no-strike clause implied in the bargaining agreement, 534 F.2d at 1073,
and then, relying on Eazor Express, concluded that such an obligation gave rise to an
implied promise by the unions to use "all reasonable means" to prevent or end
unauthorized work stoppages. Id. In response to the defendants' contention that a
"reasonable efforts" clause could not be implied from an implied no-strike clause, the
court stated:
The unions are parties to a contract not to strike over an arbitrable dispute, and
they have a contractual obligation to use all reasonable efforts to perform that
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court, concluded that such an obligation also follows necessarily from an
implied no-strike obligation. 31 Moreover, Judge Gibbons recognized that
although the Local could also be found liable on the basis of the so-called
"mass action" theory, 32 under which a union can be held responsible for the
concerted action of its members, union liability thereunder would be no more
33
than coextensive with that under a reasonable efforts obligation.
The court also made an extensive comparison of the positions taken by
other circuits in regard to prospective Boys Markets injunctions.3 4 Attempting to reach a position "somewhere between the extremes," 35 Judge Gibbons
held that while a prospective injunction may be appropriate under certain
conditions, 36 the injunction issued in the instant case was both overbroad
and vague. 37 The court stated that before issuing a prospective injunction,
the district court must make specific findings of fact concerning the types of
violations that have occurred and those that were likely to occur. 38
Furthermore, Judge Gibbons reasoned that in accordance with rule 65(d), a
contract. Concern with the integrity and efficacy of the agreed-upon arbitration
process is no less compelling when the covenant not to strike is implied rather
than express.
Id. The court also found as support for this conclusion the defendants' promise in the
bargaining agreement to "maintain the integrity of the contract." Id.
31. 534 F.2d at 1073. In so holding, Judge Gibbons extended the application of
Eazor Express, reconciling itwith Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369
U.S. 95 (1962). In that case, the Supreme Court found a no-strike obligation implicit in
a binding arbitration clause as a matter of "traditional contract law." Id. at 105.
32. 534 F.2d at 1073-74. The mass action theory was approved by the Third
Circuit in Eazor Express, wherein the court explained:
When all the members, of a union employed by a given employer engage in a
concerted strike not formally authorized by the union, as happened here, many
courts hold the union responsible on the theory that mass action by union
members must realistically be regarded as union action. The premise is that large
groups of men do not act collectively without leadership and that a functioning
union must be held responsible for the mass action of its members.
520 F.2d at 963. By finding the mass action theory to be applicable in the present case,
the Third Circuit implicitly rejected the unions' theory that their liability for damages
caused by the unauthorized breach of a contractual agreement by its officers or
members is controlled by "ordinary doctrines of agency." 534 F.2d at 1072 & n.14,
quoting UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 736 (1966).
33. 534 F.2d at 1074. The court in the instant case pointed out that the only entity
whose membership will act normally in concert is the local union. Entities higher in
the organizational structure can be held liable under the mass action theory only
upon a showing of complicity in the unlawful strike. Id. Judge Gibbons additionally
stated that under his understanding of the mass action theory, a union cannot be held
liable for damages unless there is a showing of failure to use "all reasonable efforts"
to prevent or terminate an unauthorized strike. Id. For Judge Rosenn's opposing view,
see note 42 infra.
34. See notes 22-24 supra.
35. 534 F.2d at 1077.
36. Id. As Judge Gibbons emphasized, "The court that has once determined in an
adversary proceeding the meaning of a contract must have the power to protect the
parties and itself from the necessity for and burden of repeatedly adjudicating what
often may be the identical issue." Id. He noted, however, that the prospective relief
should go only as far as the pattern of violations suggests is necessary. Id.
37. Id.; see note 8 supra.
38. 534 F.2d at 1077. The district court must also "relate the likelihood of
occurrence or recurrence to some act, omission or responsibility of each defendant
against whom such injunctive relief is ordered." Id.
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prospective injunction must inform the local of the steps it must take to
prevent recurring violations and must inform the parent organizations of
the procedures that they must follow to ensure that the local fulfills its
39
contractual obligations.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Rosenn viewed the mass action theory as
differing significantly from the contractual theory. 40 In Judge Rosenn's
view, the implication of a best efforts promise was unnecessary in light of
the explicit promises of good faith performance by the unions. 41 Judge
Rosenn's interpretation of the mass action theory would hold a local strictly
liable for those acts of its members that violate the agreement, thus
rendering irrelevant any consideration of whether the local's leadership
exercised reasonable efforts.4 2 Furthermore, under Judge Rosenn's view, rule
65(d)'s requirements of specificity and detail would not preclude the issuance
43
of an injunction against strikes over "any arbitrable grievance."
Chief Judge Seitz filed a separate opinion stating that a Boys Markets
injunction should be available, but only against the Local, and only with
regard to those work stoppages specifically before the court.4 4 Arguing in
favor of the imposition of these two limitations, the Chief Judge reasoned
that the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo
and that a more broadly framed order was unnecessary to serve that
45
purpose.
The contrasting opinions of the court preserit certain analytical
difficulties. Perhaps the most important distinction to be drawn between the
opinions of Judges Gibbons and Rosenn is their differing interpretations of
the mass action theory. While dicta in Eazor Express supports Judge
Gibbons' theory that the scope of a local's liability cannot be extended
39. Id. at 1078; see id. at 1078 n.19.
40. Id. at 1079 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
41. Id; see note 30 supra.
42. Judge Rosenn, apparently viewing the local unions as being identical to their
membership, applied the mass action theory to hold the local strictly liable on the
basis that the local had violated the agreement when, through its membership, it
began an unauthorized work stoppage. 534 F.2d at 1080-81. Judge Gibbons, on the
other hand, viewed the unions as organizational bodies composed of, but distinct from,
their membership for liability purposes. Id. at 1074.
Judge Rosenn would have found liability under the mass action theory only
on the part of the Local, "because the theory presumes that the leadership for the
mass action comes from within the group that generates the unlawful action." Id. at
1080. Under this theory, therefore, liability would be imposed upon the Local for
actions taken by the membership prior to the strike regardless of whether "all
reasonable efforts" were made by Local officials to end the strike after it had begun.
Id. at 1081. The district and international unions could be held liable, according to
Judge Rosenn, only if they failed to use reasonable efforts to terminate an illegal
strike. "Reasonableness" would be determined by the degree of control held by the

larger organizational units over the Local. Id. at 1081 n.6.
43. Id. at 1083.
44. Id. at 1082-83 (Seitz, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
45. Id. Chief Judge Seitz stated that a preliminary injunction against the Local
was all that was necessary to preserve the situation pending final determination of
the case, and that liability on the part of the district or international union should be
determined only after a full trial on the merits. Id. at 1084. He specifically expressed
no opinion as to whether section 9 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §109 (1970),
precludes a federal court from permanently enjoining such conduct. 534 F.2d at 1084.
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beyond the reasonable efforts obligation by the mass action theory, 46 it is
submitted that Judge Rosenn's view is more convincingly supported by both
logic and policy. Liability under the mass action theory is based upon the
premise that since "large groups of men do not act collectively without
leadership

. . .

a functioning union must be held liable for the mass action

of its members." 47 Given such a premise, when the membership of the union
breaches en masse a no-strike provision by which the union is contractually
bound, the union should be held responsible and the question of reasonable
efforts should be irrelevant. 48 Judge Gibbons' view of the mass action theory
as merely raising an obligation on the part of the union to use reasonable
efforts to prevent or resolve a strike 49 seemingly disregards this basic
premise. Furthermore, Judge Rosenn's view that a local should be held
strictly liable for the en masse action of its membership would also promote
the national labor policy of encouraging settlement through arbitration by
impressing upon the union members the seriousness of the union's
50

agreement not to strike.

Another analytical difficulty arises from Judge Gibbons' view of the
relationship between a union's obligation to use reasonable efforts and the
mass action theory. While Judge Gibbons pointed out that Eazor Express
and other cases have discussed reasonable efforts in relation to the mass
action theory of liability, 51 the theory is not discussed in those cases as a
limitation upon the scope of liability. Rather, the efforts exercised by a union
to prevent or terminate a strike are merely a factor for the courts to consider,
along with the extent of mass participation and the involvement of union
52
officials, in determining whether the mass action theory should apply.
46. See 520 F.2d at 965.
47. Id. at 963. From this premise, it follows that the liability must be limited to the
organizational unit (e.g., local, district, etc) whose membership is participating in
the unauthorized work stoppage. 534 F.2d at 1074.
48. See note 42 supra.
49. 534 F.2d at 1074. Judge Gibbons stated that, whatever the theory upon which
liability is premised, the district court must examine the reasonableness of the

attempts of the Local or parent union officials to avert or end an unauthorized or
illegal strike. Reasonableness would depend upon the circumstances of each case. Id.
50. Id. at 1080 n.3.
51. Id. at 1074, citing Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Local 1104, Int'l Union of Elec.
Workers, 496 F.2d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 1974), Vulcan Materials Co. v. United

Steelworkers, 430 F.2d 446, 455 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 963 (1971), United
Textile Workers v. Newberry Mills, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 366, 373 (W.D.S.C. 1965),
Portland Web Pressmen's Union v. Oregonian Publishing Co., 188 F. Supp. 859, 866

(D. Ore.), aff'd on other grounds, 286 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 912
(1961), and United States v. UMW, 77 F. Supp. 563, 566-67 (D.D.C. 1948), aff's on
other grounds, 177 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 871 (1949).
52. For example, in Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Local. 1104, Int'l Union of Elec.
Workers, 496 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1974), the Eighth Circuit affirmed the finding of the
district court that the union was responsible for its members' unauthorized strike.
Even though the defendant issued an exculpatory press release after the strike had
begun, the court of appeals agreed with the district court in considering this as only
one element of the action taken by the union and its membership both prior to and
during the strike. The district court had based its finding of liability upon "the
involvement of union officers and stewards in initiating the strike, the participation

of every one of the 2,700 union members in the strike, and the minimal efforts of the
union hierarchy in attempting to end the walkout." Id.-at 956.
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It would seem that the disagreement between Judges Gibbons and
Rosenn on the applicability of the mass action theory is crucial not only
because the respective interpretation of the theory determines the scope of
the local's liability, but also because it results in potentially different
consequences when a Boys Markets injunction is tested under rule 65(d).
Judge Gibbons' view that the injunction should specify exactly what action
the local must take5 3 stems from his conclusion that the local can avoid
liability by making reasonable efforts to end an unauthorized work
stoppage. This seems unnecessary under Judge Rosenn's theory because, in
his opinion, reasonable efforts by the local in such a situation would serve
only to mitigate what is apparently strict liability for the consequences of an
illegal strike. Moreover, Judge Gibbons' conclusion that under rule 65(d) a
prospective Boys Markets injunction must state, first, what steps a local will
be expected to take to prevent the recurrence of illegal work stoppages, and,
second, what procedure the parent organizations must follow to ensure that
the local performs its contractual obligations, is significantly more
54
restrictive than the decisions in other circuits.
In holding that a prospective injunction was available against the
unions but that such relief was to be limited to violations which the district
court found likely to occur in the future, 55 the Third Circuit attempted to
balance the federal labor policy favoring the peaceful settlement of disputes
through arbitration against the conflicting policy of discouraging injunctions against labor unions 56 Although, as the Fifth Circuit has noted, Boys
Markets was intended to be a narrow exception to the prohibition against
injunctions set forth in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 7 it is submitted that the
53. 534 F.2d at 1078.

54. The court in Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Local 1487, UMW, 500 F.2d 950 (7th Cir.
1974), considered the language of the contract between the parties to be sufficiently
specific to inform the uniol of which differences or local troubles were arbitrable. Id.
at 953. In CF & I Corp. v. UMW, 507 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1974), the court found the
decree, which listed any "strike, work stoppage, interruption of work, or picketing" as
prohibited activities, to be reasonably specific in the "common law of the shop." 507
F.2d at 173, quoting Cox, supra note 24, at 1498-99.
55. 534 F.2d at 1077. Judge Rosenn agreed with Judge Gibbons on this point, id.
at 1082, but did not join the court's statement that the district court must" 'relate the
likelihood of recurrence or occurrence to some act, omission, or responsibility of each
defendant against whom such injunctive relief is ordered.'" Id. at 1082 n.9, quoting id.
at 1077. Under certain conditions, however, Judge Rosenn apparently would not limit
an injunction to specific types of violations, but rather would allow a broad
injunction. As an example, Judge Rosenn noted:
If the district court finds that strikes have occurred and likely will occur over two
types of arbitrable grievances, e.g., employee suspensions and vacation pay, the
injunction can be limited to enjoining future strikes over only these categories of
grievances. If, however, the district court finds a proclivity to strike over every
arbitrable grievance, it may conclude that the grounds for future strikes cannot be
adequately forecast and it appropriately may issue a broad injunction.
Id. at 1082.
56. 534 F.2d at 1076. In this regard, the Third Circuit following the example of the
Supreme Court in Boys Markets. See 398 U.S. at 246-53; Note, The New Federal Law
of Labor Injunctions, 79 YALE L.J. 1593 (1970).
57. United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 519 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 1332 (1976), discussing Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398
U.S. 235, 253 (1970). In this case, the Fifth Circuit reversed a prospective anti-strike
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case should not be read so narrowly as to exclude all injunctive relief.58
Justice Brennan's oft-cited dissent in Sinclair,partially adopted by the Boys
Markets Court, indicates that an injunction may clearly be appropriate
when breaches are "threatened or will be committed."5 9 Furthermore, once
the intent of a specific provision of a labor agreement has been litigated, it
would seem unnecessary for a federal court or an employer continually to
"relitigate essentially the same issue in a slightly different context."60 An
injunction limited to the particular work stoppage before the court would
ineffectively protect the employer's contractual rights since that stoppage
could be terminated and another unauthorized strike begun over a different
arbitrable issue.61 Thus, an ad hoc adjudication of each situation as
required by the Fifth Circuit appears unsupportable when it results in

injunction drawn in the language of the bargaining agreement. The Third Circuit in
the instant case noted that it was not at all clear whether the Fifth Circuit had found
that prospective Boys Markets relief was entirely unavailable, and even if such were
the import of the case, the Third Circuit would respectfully disagree. 534 F.2d at 1077.
The Fifth Circuit's requirement that a finding be made in each case that the strike
was over an arbitrable issue before a Boys Markets injunction may issue seems to
indicate that the latter interpretation of the Fifth Circuit decision may indeed be the
case. See 519 F.2d at 1245. However, this particular discussion was merely dicta, since
the order of the district court was reversed on the ground that the work stoppages at
issue were not based upon arbitrable grievances. Id. at 1247-48.
58. The Boys Markets Court reasoned:
The literal terms of § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act must be accommodated to
the subsequently enacted provisions of §301(a) of the Labor Management
Relations Act and the purposes of arbitration. Statutory interpretation requires
more than concentration upon isolated words; rather, consideration must be given
to the total corpus of pertinent law and the policies that inspired ostensibly
inconsistent provisions.
A leading example of this accommodation process is Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R. Co., 353 U.S. 30 (1957). There we were
confronted with a peaceful strike which violated the statutory duty to arbitrate
imposed by the Railway Labor Act. The Court concluded that a strike in violation
of a statutory arbitration duty was not the type of situation to which the NorrisLaGuardia Act was responsive, that an important federal policy was involved in
the peaceful settlement of disputes through the statutorily mandated arbitration
procedure, that this important policy was imperiled if equitable remedies were not
available to implement it, and hence that Norris-LaGuardia's policy of
nonintervention by the federal courts should yield to the overriding interest in the
successful implementation of the arbitration process.
398 U.S. at 250-52.
59. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 254 (1970), quoting
Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228 (1962) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
Justice Brennan stated that, beyond the situation in which an injunction is sought
against a strike based upon an arbitrable grievance, the court must consider whether
an injunction would be warranted under traditional equitable principles:
[T]he District Court must, of course, consider whether issuance of an injunction
would be warranted under ordinary principles of equity - whether breaches are
occurring and will continue or have been threatened and will be committed;
whether they have caused or will cause irreparable injury to the employer; and
whether the employer will suffer more from the denial of an injunction than will
the union from its issuance.
370. U.S. at 228 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
60. 534 F.2d at 1077.
61. This occurred in the instant case. See note 2 supra.
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little more than wasted judicial resources and frustration of employers'
remedies.
On the other hand,. unlike the Seventh Circuit, the Third Circuit gave
renewed strength to the policy of discouraging injunctions against labor
unions by refusing to approve an injunction framed broadly in the language
of the collective bargaining agreement. Such an injunction will be approved
in the Third Circuit only if supported by findings of the district court that
certain types of violations have occurred in the past and that they are likely
to occur in the future.6 2 Although objections can obviously be made to such
an approach, restricting the district courts in this way is at least consistent
with the policy of discouraging the abuse of labor injunctions - a policy
which Boys Markets was not intended to undermine. 63 It is submitted that,
because this policy remains viable, district courts should hesitate to find
facts that would support an injunction framed in the contract language.
Obviously, this decision places district courts within the Third Circuit in
a difficult position. In issuing an injunction against an unauthorized strike,
a court must determine specifically the types of violations of the agreement
that have occurred, the likelihood of their recurrence, and other types of
violations expected to arise. 64 It would seem difficult for a district court to
determine at a preliminary hearing the precise disputes likely to trigger
future wildcat strikes. Moreover, district courts may be required to determine
which measures available to the union leadership constitute "reasonable
efforts" to end or prevent a strike in advance of the strike itself.6 5
This decision presents further difficulties because no opinion was joined
by a majority of the court. While it seems that both Judge Gibbons and
Judge Rosenn agreed that any prospective injunction issued must be limited
in coverage, to violations of the collective bargaining agreement that a
district court finds likely to recur, there was no agreement as to the extent of
the Local's liability under the mass action theory and, therefore, no
agreement as to the requirements of rule 65(d). 6 Unfortunately, in regard to
these two important questions, the Third Circuit's opinion in United States
Steel eliminates little of the uncertainty currently surrounding the area of
prospective Boys Markets injunctions.
Harold Rosen
62. See 398 U.S. at 253.

63. 534 F.2d at 1077.
64. See id.. at 1077-78.
65. As Judge Rosenn stated:
A union should not be allowed to escape injunctive restraints merely because
the range of previous violations by its members defies categorization. The
injunction "should be broad enough to prevent evasion." When past violations
may be reasonably categorized, the order should do so. When, however, the
pattern of past conduct does not readily lend itself to such treatment, I see no
objection to the use of carefully considered language broadly restraining strikes
over arbitrable grievances, especially if it can be joined with specific language, to

provide effective relief.
534 F.2d at 1083 (citations omitted).

66. See-notes 46-54 and accompanying text supra.
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LABOR LAW - UNION'S WAIVER OF ITS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT DURING
PRE-GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE HELD NOT TO AUTHORIZE EMPLOYER'S
IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMUNICATION PROGRAM To ADJUST GRIEVANCES.

United Steelworkers v. NLRB (1976)
In late 1972, Dow Chemical Company (Dow) instituted a "Speak Out"
program under which its employees were permitted to direct questions or
1
suggestions concerning their employment to the program coordinator.
Although these communications were required to be made on a special form,
an employee was not required to sign the form. 2 Upon receiving a
communication, the program coordinator would either reply or forward the
communication to a member of Dow's management staff having knowledge
of the subject matter of the communication. 3 Any reply that was made was
reviewed by Dow's management before it was sent to the employee. 4
Six months after the Speak Out program was initiated, Local 12075 of
the United Steelworkers of America (Union) filed an unfair labor practice
charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) wherein it asserted
that by engaging "in the adjustment of grievances without permitting the
Union the opportunity to be present," 5 Dow had violated section 9(a) of the
National Labor Relations Act (Act),6 which requires that the union
designated as the collective bargaining representative be "given an
opportunity to be present" when employee grievances are adjusted by the
employer.7

1. United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 536 F.2d 550, 552 (3d Cir. 1976) The employees'
union, Local 12075 of the United Steelworkers of America, was given no notice prior to
the institution of the program. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. Only those employees who had signed their communications received
replies. Id. Responses which the management found interesting were published in a
monthly employee magazine edited by Dow, although an employee could request that
his reply not be published. Id. In all, 284 communications were received from the
employees between December 1972 and November 1973. Id. at 552-53.
5. Id. at 553.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970). The Union also alleged violations of sections 8(d),
8(a)(1), and 8(a)(5) of the Act. 536 F.2d at 553. Under section 8(d), termination or
modification of a collective bargaining contract without following certain specified
procedures is a breach of the duty to bargain collectively. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
The Union contended that by instituting the Speak Out program in violation of
section 9(a), Dow had modified the contract, thus violating section 8(d). 536 F.2d at
554 n.11. Such a breach of the duty to bargain collectively constitutes an unfair labor
practice under section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5). See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5) (1970).
7. 536 F.2d at 551. Section 9(a) provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such.purposes, shall be
the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a
group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their
employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the
bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the
terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977

31

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1977], Art. 11
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

Upon examining the collective bargaining agreement between the

Union and Dow,8 the administrative law judge determined that although
Dow's conduct was, on its face, violative of section 9(a) of the Act,9 the
Union had waived its rights under that section.' 0 The administrative law
judge reasoned that the grievance adjustment procedure under the Speak
Out program "involved no variance of any material significance" from the
procedure agreed to by the Union in the collective bargaining agreement,
wherein an employee was required to present his complaint to his immediate
supervisor before resorting to the grievance procedure."
Upon the NLRB's subsequent adoption of the administrative law judge's
finding," the Union petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for
review. '3 The Third Circuit reversed,14 holding that the distinctions between
the Speak Out program and the pre-grievance procedure authorized in the
collective bargaining agreement were "sufficiently material" that a consent
by the Union to abide by the pre-grievance procedure did not constitute

further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be
present at such adjustment.
Id. (emphasis added).
While section 9(a) gives a union the right to be present during the adjustment
of grievances, it grants no similar right with regard to nongrievance matters. A
number of courts have discussed the definition of "grievance." See, e.g., Elgin, J. & E.
Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945) (grievance under the Railway Labor Act relates both
to rights possessed by employee under collective bargaining agreement and rights of
the employee arising outside of such agreement); Douds v. Local 1250, Retail
Wholesale Dep't Store Union, 173 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1949) (reinstatement of former
striking employees is grievance within meaning of section 9(a)); Hughes Tool Co. v.
NLRB, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945) (grievance under National Labor Relations Act is
usually a claim that a right under the collective bargaining agreement has not been
respected); Toledo Local 15-P, Lithographers, 175 N.L.R.B. 1072 (1969) (grievance
includes both personal grievances and contracted grievances).
8. Article III, section 3A of the collective bargaining agreement provides:
It is the intent of this Section, to establish means for prompt adjustment of
grievances at the job level with the immediate supervisor and the employee.
Therefore, in order to promote better cooperation, understanding, and labor
relations between employees, Union Representatives, and the Company, it is
agreed that an employee with a complaint or request, must first state his
complaint or request to his immediate supervisor, and will give that supervisor a
reasonable opportunity to adjust the problem before resorting to grievance
procedure. The employee may have a steward present at this meeting, but the
employee must state his own complaint.
536 F.2d at 554.
9. Id. The administrative law judge based his finding upon the assumption that
many Speak Out communications were grievances within the meaning of the Act. Id.;
see note 7 supra.
10. 536 F.2d at 554. It has been held that a union's waiver of a statutory right
must be clear and unmistakable and will not be lightly inferred. See, e.g., Radio
Television Technical School, Inc. v. NLRB, 488 F.2d 457 (3d Cir. 1973); Texaco, Inc. v.
NLRB, 462 F.2d 812, 815 (3d Cir. 1972). In Texaco, the union activity was alleged to be
a relinquishment of a protected right was ambiguous, and therefore the court
concluded that it did not constitute a valid waiver. 462 F.2d at 815.
11. See note 8 supra.
12. Dow Chemical Co., 215 N.L.R.B. 139 (1974).
13. 536 F.2d at 554. Dow intervened in the Union's appeal. Id.
14. Id. at 559. The case was heard by Judges Biggs, Gibbons, and Hunter. Judge
Hunter wrote the opinion for the unanimous court.
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consent to the procedure embodied in the Speak Out program. United
Steelworkers v. NLRB, 536 F.2d 550 (3d Cir. 1976).
The Third Circuit premised its analysis upon the well-established
principle that "a waiver of a statutory right must be clearly and
unmistakably established, and that express language will not be read
expansively." 15 Then, focusing upon the difference between the Speak Out
program and the pre-grievance procedure embodied in the collective
bargaining agreement,1 6 the court pointed to several crucial distinctions
between the two: 1) unlike the procedure embodied in the collective
bargaining agreement, Speak Out submissions were to be reviewed by
members of Dow's middle and upper management;' 7 2) Speak Out
submissions were permitted to be made after a formal grievance had been
filed;'" and 3) unlike the procedure described in the collective bargaining
agreement, employees submitting communications under Speak Out could
remain anonymous.' 9 The court concluded that these distinctions taken
together were "material"; therefore, the consent given by the Union to the
pre-grievance procedure embodied in the collective bargaining agreement
20
did not constitute consent to the Speak Out program.
In so holding, the Third Circuit recognized that the Speak Out program
could impair the Union's position as the collective bargaining representative
in several ways.
[T]he "Speak Out" procedure may increase the likelihood that a
particular grievance issue will be considered and decided by middle and

15. Id. at 555; see note 10 supra.For the text of the contractual provision in which
the Union allegedly waived its section 9(a) rights, see note 8 supra. The court
conjectured that the goal of such a procedure might well have been "[to minimize]
unwarranted resort to the grievance mechanism by 'weeding out' those complaints
resulting from simple misunderstanding or oversight, as well as those so trivial that
the employee would be unwilling to make an initial statement of his own case to his
immediate superior." 536 F.2d at 555.
16. 536 F.2d at 555.
17. Id. at 555-56. This review might be held before the Union had the opportunity
to make its position known, or even before it had notice of the dispute. Furthermore, a
question would arise as to whether the resolution of a matter in a Speak Out reply
would become binding precedent in later grievance matters. Id. at 557. The court did
not decide this question, but noted that it could foresee some practical and
psychological effect were the same issue decided in a Speak Out reply to arise in a
subsequent grievance hearing. Id.
18. Id. at 556. Under the collective bargaining agreement, the presentation of a
grievance to an immediate supervisor had to occur before resort to the grievance
mechanism. See note 8 supra.Under the Speak Out program there were no safeguards
to protect against simultaneous adjustments of the same grievance under both the
collective bargaining agreement and Speak Out since a Speak Out submission could
be made either before, during, or after filing a formal grievance. 536 F.2d at 556. The
possibility of dual proceedings made it difficult to argue that Speak Out was the
equivalent of the pre-grievance procedure authorized under the collective bargaining
agreement. Id.
19. 536 F.2d at 556.
20. Id. The court commented that the administrative law judge's reliance upon
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d at 126 (7th Cir. 1963), had been improper.
536 F.2d at 556 n.20. Westinghouse did not involve the question of whether there had
been a waiver of section 9(a) rights, but whether any grievances had been adjusted.
325 F.2d at 128.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977

33

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1977], Art. 11

882

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

upper management before the Union's position is heard, or before the
Union even has notice of the dispute
.

.

. "Speak Out" replies may well take on greater impact, as

compared to a response from an immediate supervisor, in determining
whether the complaining employee will follow through with a formal
grievance and whether other employees will pursue similar claims.
* . . (T)he "Speak Out" system offers flexibilities of time and source
of relief . . . [that] could . . . reduce the Union's ability to plan the

processing of grievances in an orderly and internally consistent
manner.2
The court sought to avoid such a detrimental impact upon the Union's
ability to represent the employees effectively. 2
With the instant decision the Third Circuit has maintained a balance
between the competing interests of the employer and the union in the area of
grievance adjustment. While the employer seeks to ensure that the grievance
adjustment procedure does not substantially affect the daily operation of its
business, the union, as the collective bargaining representative, desires to
provide the employees whom it represents with a grievance adjustment
system which is free from potential for employer abuse.23 Section 9(a),
enacted to ensure that a fair and workable grievance procedure would exist
despite these competing interests, 24 evidences congressional concern that a
union which is not permitted to be present during grievance adjustment may
21. 536 F.2d at 557.
22. Dow introduced figures demonstrating that grievance activity had not
declined following the inception of the Speak Out program. Id. at 558. The court
rejected the relevance of such evidence, noting that the congressional determination
that possible adverse consequences could occur from failing to have a union

representative present at grievance adjustment proceedings, rendered unnecessary a
finding of the occurrence or nonoccurrence of such consequences. Id. The court
indicated that many factors may affect the filing of grievances; furthermore, Dow's
figures failed to indicate whether there were any changes in the type of grievances
filed or in the Union's rate of success in the processing of grievances. Id.
23. See Dunau, Employee Participatioriin The Grievance Aspect of Collective
Bargaining,50 COLUM. L. REV. 731 (1950). Some of the abuses foreseen by Congress
were the potential for employer discrimination between employees who support the
union and those who do not, the possibility that an employer may take inconsistent
positions in resolving similar grievances presented by different employees, and the
possibility that an employer will endeavor to make it appear that employees will be
treated more favorably if they do not avail themselves of the union's grievance
procedure. 93 CONG. REc. 3624 (1947) (remarks of Rep. Lanham); see note 25 infra.
24. The House version of section 9(a) did not contain the second proviso
guaranteeing the union the right to be present during grievance adjustment.

Congressman Lanham criticized this omission:
To grant individual employees or minority groups of employees the right to
present and settle grievances which relate to wages, hours, and conditions of
employment without permitting the representative of the majority of the

employees to participate in the conference and join in any adjustment is to
undermine the very foundations of the act. To create rivalry, dissension,
suspicion, and friction among employees, to permit employers to play off one
group of employees against another, to confuse the employees would completely
undermine the collective-bargaining representative and would be disastrous.
93 CONG. REC. 3624 (1947). The second proviso was later added by the Senate, and this
version was subsequently enacted. For the text of section 9(a), see note 7 supra.
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lose its ability to represent effectively those employees who are artfully
"persuaded" by their employer to accede to a position unfavorable to the
union. 25 However, balanced against its concern for the union was Congress'
recognition that a grievance procedure should not be so cumbersome as to
constitute a major interruption in an employer's business; thus, under
section 9(a), a union is permitted to be present only during the adjustment of
grievances and has no statutory right to be present during an employeremployee discussion of nongrievance matters. 26 The Third Circuit, in
deference to these congressional concerns, narrowly construed the Union's
limited waiver of its section 9(a) rights as contained in the collective
27
bargaining agreement.
The instant decision does not invalidate all employee communication
programs in which the union is not given an opportunity to be present.
Employers wishing to implement programs similar to Dow's Speak Out
program have several options available to them. As suggested by the court,
these employees could negotiate a waiver provision to be included in the
collective bargaining agreement which would be broad enough to cover a
program of this nature.2 However, the potential for employer abuse in such
a program would likely make the union uneasy with. the employer's
increased control over grievances. 29 Moreover, as a practical matter, it is
doubtful that a union would be willing to waive its statutory right to be
present at grievance adjustment unless strict procedural guidelines were
imposed.30 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit's adherence to the rules that a
waiver of statutory rights must be clearly established and that express
language should not be read expansively may alleviate some of the union's
uneasiness with such a waiver provision, as the union might not fear an

25. 93 CONG. REC. 3624 (1947) (remarks of Rep. Lanham). This type of
"persuasion" by the employer serves to create the impression that a better deal or
even the same deal could be had without resort to the union. Due to a resulting lack of
support by the member employees, this would weaken the union's position when it
does bargain with the employer. To permit this situation would tend to destroy the
uniform application of the collective bargaining agreement. Elgin, J. E. Ry. v. Bailey,
325 U.S. 711, 737 n.35 (1945).
26. See notes 6 & 7 supra. It should be noted that while a number of cases have
discussed the definition of a "grievance," the distinction between a "grievance,"
where a union has a right to be present, and a "gripe," where no right to be present
exists, has elicited no clear answer. See note 7 supra.
27. See notes 15-20 and accompanying text supra.
28. 536 F.2d at 559. Such a waiver would also have to be explicit in order to be
effective in light of the courts' policy regarding waiver by a union of a statutory right.
See note 10 supra.
29. See note 23 and accompanying text supra. A union might worry about
inconsistent interpretations of the collective bargaining agreement which could
destroy its uniform application. See note 25 and accompanying text supra. Also, a
question decided during a procedure similar to that authorized by the Speak Out
program may take on practical or psychological precedental value in a later grievance
procedure. 536 F.2d at 557.
30. Such a procedural standard might provide, for example, that an employer give
the union a summary of the grievance matters that the employer had adjusted and
that the union have the right to demand and be present at a rehearing of any
grievance adjustment of which it disapproves.
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interpretation of the waiver provision that would authorize forms of

31
employer action not contemplated at the time the waiver was negotiated.
As a second option available to employers wishing to implenment
programs similar to Speak Out, the court suggested a program which would
not involve the union's waiver of its section 9(a) rights.32 Under such a
program, an employer could invite employees to submit communications,
examine the submissions to ensure that no grievances were involved, and
then handle only the nongrievance communications. 33 Although such a
program would not be able to accommodate as wide a range of communications as a program instituted by exacting a waiver of the union's section 9(a)
rights, since only nongrievance submissions could be handled, it would
nevertheless encourage employer-employee communications.
In conclusion, the instant decision demonstrates that while innovative
programs such as Speak Out may add flexibility to the grievance procedure,
these programs must be structured so as to avoid infringing upon a union's
section 9(a) rights. If this can be achieved, the working relationship between
an employer and its employees could be enhanced without undermining the
union's position as an effective collective bargaining representative.

Jerome P. Gilligan
31. See note 10 and accompanying text supra. The Third Circuit made a similar
suggestion concerning the use of the waiver. 536 F.2d at 559 n.26.
32. 536 F.2d at 559.
33. Id. However, since there is no clear definition of what constitutes a
"grievance" as compared to a "gripe," it would be diffficult for a program coordinator
to draw this distinction. See note 7 supra. An employer may find such a program
unworkable due to administrative difficulties in determining what can and cannot be
resolved, or may find that once the grievances are eliminated, the matters actually
dealt with may prove so trivial as to make the program virtually useless in resolving
difficulties in the plant.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol22/iss3/11

36

